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Preface
From the perspective of human rights observance and research, the worId
has in many respects, never appeared more promIsing than today, one
month before the opening of the second W orId Conference on Human
Rights.
Human rights concerns have gained unprecedented promInence in
international politics. Although there still is a considerable difference
between rhetorical proclamations of human rights commtment and what is
reflected in practical politics, concern for democracy and human rights is
increasingly manifest in the activities of international organisations such as
the United Nations, the European Community and the World Bank, as well
as in the foreign policy of a growing number of countres.
From being a matter of interest maily for academIcs and idealistically
oriented activists, research on the relationship between varous categories
of human rights, between human rights and economIc and political
development, and research on how human rights respect may be measured
and how monitoring may be conducted, is becomIng increasingly relevant
in the political debate. The tie is ripe for "human rights and democracy",
and political decision makers are turning to human rights research for tools.
In ths report we have chosen to give a broad presentation of the main
debates in human rights research withn the fields of social science and
humanities. We have given ourselves a complicated task as the field of
research is both vast and volumInous. The report covers a wide range of
disciplines, from most social science traditions, via history of law and
philosophy to history. Naturally, we have only presented a fraction of a
wide range of issues and debates. We hope, neverteless, that our selection
wil ilustrate the great scope of the research-area.
The report is a revised and updated version of a volume prepared in 1990
appearng in thelarger study "Human rights in light of development theory"
in 1990. This four volume study was conducted by the Programme of
Human Rights Studies at the Chr. Michelsen Institute for the Norwegian
Ministr of Development Cooperation (now merged with Ministr of
Foreign Affais). Dur report was originally published in Norwegian (CMI
Report R 1991: 6). This revised version has been translated into English by
Tone M. Anderssen.
v
We would like to thank especially the following people for commenting
on drafs of the report: Åshild Samøy, Lars Gule, Bård Anders
Andreassen, Bernt Hagtvet, Astr Suhrke and Are Tostensen. Furermore,
we would like to express our gratitude to the Norwegian Ministr of
Foreign Affais for financial support.
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Introduction
International politics and the role of human rights research
Human rights concernsare gaining unprecedented promInence in
international politics. Although there still is a considerable difference
between the human rights commtment proclaimed at the level of rhetoric
and what is reflected in practical politics, concern for democracy and
human rights is increasingly manifest in the activities of international
organisations such as the United Nations, the European Community and the
W orId Bank, as well as in the foreign policy of a growing number of
countries. This trend is paricularly visible in relation to aid policies. Many
countreshave made democratization and good government conditions of
development aid - concepts which increasingly seem to be regarded as
synonymous with human rights.
In the course of this process the role of human rights research is
changing. From being a matter of interest mainly for academics and
idealistically oriented activists, research on the relationship between varous
categories of human rights, between human rights and economIc and
political development, and research on how human rights respect may be
measured and how monitoring may be conducted, is becomIng increasingly
relevant in the political debate.The time is ripe for "human rights and
democracy", and political decision makers are turning to human rights
research for tools.
This development, although positive from the point of view of human
. rights, also entails challenges and places new burdens on researchers.
Accustomed to the meagre Iife of workig in. opposition, human rights
researchers must tae care not to be blinded by power. A critical and
academIcally responsible human rights research is more crucial than ever
before. Does political libertes increase economIc growth under all
conditions? Furter, isdemocracy the best guarantee for human rights
respect under all circumstances? These and simIlar questions need thorough
investigation more than ideologically correct answers. Norms agreed to by
the most powerfl nations of the worId are not necessarly universally valid,
or even tre. And while all good thngs may be combined in politics,
empircal data and reality may turn out to be far more complicated.
VIl
The aim of this study is to review central debates on human rights within
the social sciences and humanities with a view to bringing forward what we
do and do not know about human rightsand development.
In the first chapter we wil look at the development of international
human rights instrments in the postwar period, in relation to the United
Nations as well as regionally in Europe, the Americas, Afrca and the
IslamIc worId.
The universal legitimacy of human rights is the themeof Chapter two.
Can a set of norms so c10sely linked to Euro-American culture and
development be universally valid? The issue is obviously relevant for the
use of human rights in foreign policy. It is contested by a number of Third
World politicians, and widely debated among scholars.
What is in fact the relationship between human rights and economIc
development? Is it, as has been commonly held by development
economIsts, possible to increase economIc growth or development in Third
W orId countres by sacrificing certin civil and political rights, or by
allowing greater inequalities? Or can democracy and respect for human
rights on the contrar furter economIc development, as is now of ten
argued? Is the United Nations' credo of human rights as "indivisible and
interdependent" empircally correct, or do the varous rights invarably
conflct? Debates over human rights trade-offs have been rollng back and
fort; the controversies are outlined in Chapter thee.
Chapter four focuses on the same theme, discussing at some length the
relationship between human rights and regime form. Are varous types of
regimes capable of respecting human rights? What is the relationship
between democracy and human rights?
In the fift, and last, chapter we look into the role of human rights in
foreign policy. We wil focus on questions related to makng human rights
respect a condition for development aid, and furter, we discuss the
expanding business of election observance. When human rights respect
forms the basis of political decisions, with considerable political and
economIc consequences for the countres affected, the question of which
standard of human rights is chosen as the point of deparre, and how
reliable and unbiased information may be obtained, becomes. essential. A
substantial par of this chapter is devoted to methodological and ethical
aspects of monitoring, reportng and measuring the human rights
performance of developing countres.
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1. The development of international
human rights instruments in the
postwar period
The UN system and human rights protection
The idea of human rights goes back centuries, but commtment to human
rights did not get an international political breakough until the founding
of the United Nations (UN) in 1945.
The issue of human rights was on the agenda in the worId organisation
from the very beginning. The UN-charr (adopted 26 lune 1945) included
a numberof references to human rights, and declared that promotion of
human rights was to be one of the main taks of the new organisation. Of
the many planned commssions, only the UN Commssion on Human
Rights was explicitly mentioned in the Charer. Ths commtment to human
rights issues, as mIrrored in the UN Charer and later in the DecIaration of
Human Rights, should mainly be seen as a reaction to World War Il and
the actions of the Nazis. In spite of the different ideological and political
views of the victors, their common rejection of nazi atrocities was to result
in the Universal DecIaration of Human Rights, adopted on 10 December
1948. The timIng was of great importance, enabling the declaration to be
passed unanimously. In 1948, memories of the war were stil fresh and the
two new super-powers were stil on speakng terms. Samnøy shows how the
atmosphere of cooperation cooled towards the end of the process, and how
the cold war could have weakened the prospects of general agreement being
reached, had the decIaration not been completed at such an early stage
(Samøy 1993).
The DecIaration of Human Rights was only the first par of a thee-fold
task. As decIarations are not binding, according to international law, the set
of Human Rights was to be supplemented by a) a covenant, more detail ed
than the Declaration, which would be legally binding for the ratifying states
and b) provisions for implementation of the covenant.
In 1948 it was generally assumed that ths would progress quickly, but
history has shown this to have been too optimIstic. Differing views on the
rights resulted in the adoption of two covenants instead of one; one on civil
and political rights and one devoted to social, economIc and cultural rights.
i
AIso, a political shift in the United States in the early fifties caused a
significant decrease in the effort to secure international Human Rights (Cf
Pratt 1986 and Mower 1979) Due to the cold war and problems related to
decolonisation, the two Conventions were not approved until 1966. An
additional ten years passed before a suffcient number of countres had
ratified the m, and thus the Conventions were not implemented until 1976.
The UN' s work on human rights may be divided into thee phases, based
on the thee different tasks of the Commssion. In the first two decades, the
main task was to create legally binding norm from the rights set out in the
Declaration. In the decade following the adoption of the Human Rights
Conventions in 1966, the commssion concentrated on makng states
acknowledge and ratify the UN-decisions. The thd phase is domInated by
attempts to develop a system for supervision and control of the
implementation of the Human Rights. This work on enforcement-
mechanisms did not begin until about 1970.
Even though different tasks have been emphasised at different stages, the
phases intertwine: the efforts to make countres ratify The International Bil
of Human Rights is still going on. i By 1992, 104 states had signed the
Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, while 106 countries
had signed the International Covenant on Social, EconomIc and Cultural
Rights.2 Besides, new conventions concerning human rights are continually
being created in connection with the International Bil of Human Rights.
Some of the most importt are the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees of 1951, the Convention on the ElimInation of All Forms of
Racial DiscrimInation (1965), the Convention against Torture (1984), the
Declaration on the Right to Development (1986) and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child.3
"The International Bil of Human Rights" is a collective tenn applied to what is regarded
as the nucleus of the international instrments in the field of human rights: The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Adopted on 10 December 1948), the
International Covenant on Economic, Sodal and Cultural Rights (1966), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (Lawson 1991:917). Also a
fifth instrment; the Convention on the Elimination of All fonns of Radal
Discrimination . (1965), is sometimes recognised as a par of. the International Bil of
Human Rights.
2 The Covenants are, however, only raufed by 100 and 103 states, respectively (Amnesty
International Annual Report 1992:300-304).
For a full list of international instrments concerned with human rights. cf. Lawson
(1991:1851-1856) and Samøy (1993).
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A hierarchy of rights?
As noted, the legal status of the varous documents that con 
sti tute The
International Bil of Human Rights differs. Whle the Universal DecIaration
of Human Rights was not constrcted as a legally binding document, the
conventions are legally binding for the state pares that sign and ratify
them. However, the increasingly importt position, internationaIly, of the
DecIaration has caused it to attan force of law as par of customar
international law. As such it is binding on all states, not only those
explicitly recognising it.
As for the two conventions, there are controversies regarding their
relative status. It has repeatedly been argued, especially by Western
countres, that political and civil rights should be given priority over
economIc, social and cultual rights. The wording of the conventions has
been taken to support ths view: Whle the Convention on Civil and
Political Rights orders an immediate duty on states to comply with the
regulations of the convention, the states are only urged "to tae steps, with
a view to achieving progressively" the realisation of the social, economIc
and cultual rights to the maximum of the available resources within the
nation, and though international assistace.4
Ths view that civil and political rights should take precedence over
social and economIc rights is also supported by conservative scholars who
argue that only civil and political rights are rights in the proper sense, that
is, precise claims that individuals may direct towards an institution (or
person), which (who) wiI have a corresponding duty to act in accordance
with the cIaims. The rights specified in the Covenant on EconomIc, Social
and Cultural rights do not generally qualify as rightsaccording to this
narow definition, where a corresponding duty is required, and what is
needed for the right to be respected or fuIflled must be clearly stated. This
rights definition is, however, not undisputed. Rights may also be seen to
arse from unfulfilled basic needs.
Withn the UN the debate on the internal status and validity of the
varous types of rights Was "resolved" in 1977 when the General Assembly
adopted resolution 32/130 where it is stated that the varous categories of
Human Rights are mutually interrelated andinseparable and that one
categoty cannot tae priority over another.5 Against this background,
4 Cf. lntemauonal Covenant on EconoDÚc, Social and Cultural Rights, Anic1e 2. L .
5 This decision is the result of a process that was staed on a World Conference on
Human Rights in Teheran in 1968. The Third World countres presented a common
c1aim that the econoDÚc and social rights were to be given same legal status as the civil
and poliucal. Furtennore, the third world representatives presented a c1aim that the
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economIc, social and cultural rights and civil and political rights have equal
status within the UN system. In December 1989, the General Assembly
reaffired (resolution 44/129) "that all human rights and fundamenta
freedoms are indivisible and interrelated and that the promotion and
protection of one category of rights should never accept or excuse states
from the protection and promotion of the other" (Lawson 1991:957). Such
"proc1amatory solutions" cannot, however, prevent that internal conflcts
between different Human Rights may in fact arse. Nor have they prevented
a continued genuine political dissension on which rights are to be given
priority and precedence in a situation of conflct. We wil return to these
questions in the thd chapter of ths study.
Supervision and control of the implementation of human
rights
Establishing norms is just one par of the international concern for Human
Rights. It was established at the outset that. in order to contrbute to
increased respect for Human Rights, the UN would have to act on concrete
violations of rights. However, much due to the cold war it was impossible
to supervise the protection of rights in many states. The political climate
had a "neutralising" effect; few states wanted to get involved in the power
strggle between the two super powers (Van Boven 1985:8-20).
In the 1990s, afer the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international
situation - and the significance of the UN - is greatly changed. The scope
of the W orId Organisation has widened, and it now plays a more political
role. With this development human rights concerns are becomIng an
important basis for political decision-makng. As wil be discussed at length
in the last chapter of this study, human rights indicators are gradually
becoming more relevant to the economIc institutions of the UN-system,
such as the UNP and the W orId Bank. Election assistance and election
observance are other areas where UN activities have rapidly increased in
recent years, and where human rights concerns generally , and concerns for
democracy in parcular, play a central role. Even though the UN has
cared out election observance in some fort Y countres over the last 45
years, its commtment has deepened significantly the last few years, as
expressed by the establishment of the Electoral Assistance Unit of the
United Nations in October 1992.
commtment to Human Rights was to be connected to the work for development.
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With the political development towards a "uni-polar" world, gross
violations of human rights also figure more promiently as a basis for
mIlita involvement on the par of the UN. This was highly present - at
least at the level of rhetoric - durng the Iraqi war in 1991, and is currently
seen in relation to UN milita involvement in countres such as
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia,and Somalia.
However, althoughthe process has cIearly gaied pace and momentum
since the fall of the BerIin Wall, the role played by the UN in the
implementation and observance of Human Rights changed much earlier
than this. The change may be dated to 1970 and the international reactions
against the apanheid-regime in South Afrca (Van Boven i 985). Against
the background of terrble violations of human rights during the Sharevile
massacre (1960), the UN Special Commttee Against Apareid proposed
in 1967 that the Commssion on Human Rights should look into the
conditionsof political prisoners in South-Afrca. The Human Rights
Commssion then established an expert commttee consisting of expert
jurists, the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Southem Afrca. Later on,
the Commssion has also been involved in countres such as Chile,
Guatemala and EI Salvador.
In addition to the appointment of such "W orkig Groups" and "Special
Rapporteurs"- expert called upon by the UN Commssion of Human
Rights to perform fact-finding tasks - the Commssion itself has been
authorised to examne, report and publicly criticise human rights violations
through the so called "1235" and "1503"-procedures.6 Accusations of
human rights violations are initially treated confidentially, in order to move
the state in question to cooperate in the investigation and, if possible,
improvement of the conditions. Jf nothingis achieved, full publicity is the
implicit theat.
Each of the two covenants also makes provisions for its own body of
supervision and control of the implementation of their obligations. The
'Human Rights Commttee, authorised to supervise the implementation of
the provisions incIuded in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, staed its work as a monitoring organ in 1976, while the
Commttee on EconomIc, Social and Cultual Rights, authorised to monitor
the implementation of the provision in the International Co ven ant on Social,
6 These procedures are named after the relevant Resolution numbers of the Economic and
Social Council where the authorisation to do this has been given (Eide 1989:29).
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EconomIc and Cultural Rights, met for the first time in March 1987
(Lawson 1991:222,773).7
Although this represents great improvements compared to the time before
1970, the decision to investigate certn countres is still more a result of
what the member countres are able to agree on than an indication of the
seriousness of the human rights violations in question. Control within the
UN system is still very politicised, and human rights arguments are much
used as regime criticism. In practice, the Commssion on Human Rights has
only reacted against violations of civil and political rights, although it is to
react against all categories of rights violations. This double standard or
selectivity has been strongly criticised, and it is widely agreed that it must
be changed.
Another weakess in the supervision system is that although the states
that have ratified the two conventions are obliged to report to the respective
commttees, the UN system cannot sanction states that do not fulfil their
obligations. Reports that are delivered toa late, or never delivered at all, is
an ongoing problem (Cf. Amesty International Report 1992:307-310). This
system of self-reportng has the weakess of any such arangement: The
less a state is prepared to let the international community know about the
human rights situation withn its borders, the smaller the likelihood of that
countr handing over its annual report~
In a discussion. of supervision and control of human rights, it is necessar
to call attention to the work cared out by Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International, Minority Rights
Group and the International Commssion of Jurists.8 The scope of this
report does not allow details on the volunta organisations, their work and
role. It is nevertheless importnt to stress the fact that voluntar
organisations contrbute to the development and consolidation of a human
rightsculture and common respect and understanding of human rights. Such
an internalisation of human rights norms is vital for the protection of the
rights.
7 Three other Convention systems also exist under the UN, supervising theimplementation
of varous conventions (Commttee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERn),
Commttee against Torture (CA T), Commttee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDA W). There are also bodies responsible for supervision and
control of Conventions operated by the International Labor Organisation (llO) system
and the UN Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) (CF. Eide.
1989:30 and Lawson 1991).
8 For a list of NGOs concerned with huma rights. and furter information on their
activities. consult the entres under NGOs' in the Subject Index of Lawson (1991: 1896).
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In order to understand the development of human rights norm durng the
postwar period, it is importnt to seeths development as par of a political
process where allances within the UN are decisive for which norms are to
be given status as human rights. UN-resolutions provide a reality to relate
to, but at the same time, the varous norms have been given unequal
weight, and the general formulations that characterise man 
y of the
rèsolutions cover many differences. This in turn creates problems when
provisions are to be made for supervision and control of their
implementation.
Ths review of the development of the UN' s work for human rights
shows thatthe goal of international legal protection of universal human
rights has yet to be reached, and that it may never be totaly adequate. As
long as the international community consists of independent states, the
primar responsibilty to secure observance of human rights wIl always lie
with each individual state, and the UN wiI only have limIted possibilty to
sanctIon violations. But even though the international system has many
flaws and at times may seem weak, it is. importt to be aware of the
historical dimensions. Some ten years back it would have been impossible
to imagine internationalorgans commttng themselves to human rights
issues within each single state, and the postwar development must thus be
characterised as revolutionar. To legitimately intenere with the internal
affairs of sovereign states is something entirely new within international
law.
Regional human rights instruments
On the regional level, outside the UN system, several multi-lateral
agreements have emerged, all of which are based on the UN Declaration
of Human Rights. There are at present thee regional convention systems:
the European, the Inter-American and the Afrcan.
Of the regional human rights instrments, the European Convention on
Human Rights(adopted in November 1950) is the more developed, in the
sense that implementation of the human rights and the development of
control mechanisms to a large extent has been cared out. Within ths
framework, we flnd the European Commssion on Human Rights and the
European Cour of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The European convention
only deals with civil and political rights.
The American conventIon on Human Rights, also known as the Pact of
San Jose, was adopted by the Organisation of American States (OAS) in
November 1969 and entered into force in July 1978. It is roughly
comparable to the European ConventIon, als o in that an Inter-American
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Commssion on Human Rights and an Inter-American Court of Human
Rights are provided for, in order to oversee the implementation of its
provisions. An additional protocol, the protocol of San Salvador, adding
certn economIc, socIal and cultual rights to the list, was adopted by the
OAS in November 1988 (Lawson 1991:44).
In lune 1981, the Organisation of Afrcan Unity (OAU) adopted the
Afrcan Charer on Human and Peoples Rights as a supplement to the UN
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. The Afrcan Charer, which is
often cited as the Banjul Charer, entered into force in October 1986 after
being ratified by a majority- of the OAU member states. The charer
incIudes provisions for the establishment of the Afrcan Commssion on
Human Rights "to promote human and peoples' rights and ensure their
protection in Afrca".9 The Banjul Charer is unique in several ways: the
same document deals with civil and political rights as well as with
economIc, social and cultural rights, it sets out obligations as well as rights
of human beings, and it deals with the rights of peoples as well as of
individuals (Lawson 1991:12).
In addition to these regional systems there have been initiatives by NGOs
for the adoption of regional human rights instrments in Asia and the Arab
worId. In 1983 the regional council of Human Rights in Asia. produced a
"regional DecIaration of Human Rights": The Declaration of the Basic
Duties of AS/AN Peoples and Govemments.1O Arab experts on Human
Rights produced a Chaner on Human and People's Rights in the Arab
World in 1986, but so far no Arab state has acknowledged the document.
In the following section this proposal for an Arab Charer on Human
Rights, and the African Banjul Charer, wil be dealt with more thoroughly,
stressing the differences between these documents and the European
Convention and the International Bil of Human Rights.
The Banjul Charter
The Banjul Charer, the Afrcan declaration of human rights, expresses the
intention to reflect an African understanding of human rights - a
parcularstic trait which separates it from the "universalistic" European
9 Anicle 30 of the African Charer on Human and Peoples Rights. Cf. Lawson
i 991: 13-19).
lO The Regional Council on Human Rights in Asia is an international NGO with
consultaúve status with the UN Economic and Social CounciL. It was founded in 1982
and consists of civil rights leaders in five Asian and Pacific countries: Indonesia.
Malaysia, the Philippines. Singapore and Thailand (Lawson 1991: 1289).
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and American declarations. "(The Charer) should take as pattern the
Afrcan Philosophy of Law and meet the needs of Afrca" (Okere
1984:145). Ths seems to imply that the human rights as they appear in the
International Bil of Human Rights conflct in some areas with Afrcan
culture and self-understanding.
What fuer separtes the Afrcan Declartion from the European 
and
the American, is that it includes a set of duties in connection with the
individual rights (Ar. 27-29).While the American and European
declarations only refer to the duties of the state towards individuals, the
Banjul declaration statesthat the individual has duties to his famly, rus
local community and the state. 
l i The references to duties are justified by
communitaan philosophy, arguing that individual rights may only be
realised though the local community, or though group-belonging.
A third factor, makng the Banjul declaration unique, is the importce it
attches to social, economIc and collective rights, focusing explicitly on the
right to development. Six arcles refer to the rights of "the people", or
collective rights. But even though the Afrcan declaration stressescollective
rights and emphasises that human rights must be seen as rights connected
to.both individuals and groups, the term "people" is not defined anywhere
in the decIaration. Communalism is given as a special feature thoughout
Afrcan history, but it is not cIear whether this refers to the Iocal
community or to the national state (Howard 1986:7).
Criticism agaist the Banjul decIaration has parcularly been directed at
the use of collective rights (Anyang' Nyong'o 1992, Howard 1986).
Howard finds that the term "peoples" essentially refers to the national state
and cIaims that "... rather it is an attempt to use an ideology of Afrcan
communalism to justify reaffrmation of national interests ... by referrng
to weakly integrated nation states as peoples" (Howard 1986:7).12 She
goes on to criticise the principle of individual duties to the state. Par thee
of aricle 29 of the Banjul declaration reads as follows: "The individual has
a duty not to compromIse the security of the state whose national or
residenthe is." In practice, Howard says, this implies individual duties
toward the ruling cIass. Issa G. Shivji shares her views, and claims that the
inclusion of aricles on individual duties (to the state) incorporates the
autocracy of Mobutu (Zaire) and the traditionalism of Banda (Malawi) in
i i See arcle 29, in the first par of the declartion, chapter 2. Cf. also Gittleman
(1984:152), Welsh and Melzer (1984), Peter (1990).
12 This opinion is expressed by severa of the authors in Downing and Hushner (1 988) and
by Jack Donelly (1984).
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the "good famly" of human rights observing nations, according to the
stadards of the Banjul Declaration (Shivji 1989:98).
When discussing differences between the Afrcan declaration and other
international norms for human rights protection, it is appropriate to ask how
African the Banjul declaration really is. Afrcan conceptions of human
rights before colonisation are only to a very small extent documented by
written sources (especially as far as Sub-Saharan Afrca is concerned), but
social anthopologists have made significant contrbutions in the analysis
of legal strctues and their significance for the protection of human rights
in the se societies (Mahalu 1985).13 Their conclusion is that most
traditional societies acknowledged certain fundamenta inalienable rights.
However, the se cannot be interpreted in the sense of rights of the individual
as opposed to political authority. Protection of human rights in traditional
Afrcan societies was based on collective strctures (Mahalu 1985). Social
anthropologists also maintan that most Afrcan societies contained
important democratic processes. Selection of leadership is one example,
where the group worked together to reach a consensus; another example is
the varous mechansms that protected subjects against tyrannical leaders
(Mahalu 1985).
There is reason to claim that in traditional Afrcan societies, there existed
conceptions of rights that implied the acknowledgement and protection of
important hun:an rights. But these conceptions are fundamentally different
from the Euro'-American understanding of rights. While several scholars, as
already noted, have focused on the negative aspects of these differences,
others maintain that "perhaps the international legal community has much
to lear from societies where a philosophy of compromIse predomInates
over moral and legal absolutism" (Schier 1988:94).
In the matter of supervising the implementation of human rights, there
are great differences between the Banjul declaration and the American and
European declarations of human rights. "African states, still jealous of their
newly acquired national sovereignty have not yet come around to conceding
to an international judicial body for the arbitration of human rights
questions" (Okere 1984: 158). In the Banjul declaration, the authority of the
commssion is restrcted to investigation and aritration; it has no legal
force, as opposed to the European and American Commssions.14 However
each state is instrcted, byaricIe 62, to present a yearly report on what
13 Cf. also BeBo (1981) and Elias (1988).
14 For a discussion of the problems conceming "soft 1aw" in relauon to the Banjul
declarauon see discussion in Umozurike (1988).
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measures have been taen to realise the rights and freedoms expressed in
the decIaration.
Despite the criticism that is voiced against different aspects of the Banjul
Charer, it has had considerable political signficance. The Organization of
African Unity had by the end of the 1970s lost credibilty both withn
Afrca and in the international mIIieu due to the gross human rights
violations tang place in its member states. The OAU was referred to as
"the trade union of Afrcan state leaders" (Jackson & Rosberg 1985).
Criticisms of the apartheid-regime in South Afrca did not have much
leverage when voiced by an organisation ignoring atrocities such as the
terror ofIdi Anùn in Uganda (1971-1979), Bokassa's regime in the Central
African Republic (1966-1979) and the massacres in Burundi (1972-73). In
this perspective the adoption of an Afrcan Charer on human rights in
1981, should be seen as a positive step towards recognising the
International Bil of Human Rights.
To sum up, how Afrcan is the Banjul charer? A large percentage of the
Afrcan academIc and political elite were educated at Western universities,
and their way of thnkng is often very Westernised. And the significance
of traditional Afrcan conceptions of rights in the shaping of the Banjul
declaration should not be exaggerated. As both Shivji and Okere have
pointed out, the makng of the declaration must be understood against the
background of international events where the Carer admInistration' s
emphasis on human rights in its foreign policies, and the international
reactions to serious violations of human rights on the Afrcan continent,
were central factors. It has been argued that the Afrcan human rights
rhetoric was, and stil is, mainly intended for a foreign audience (Shivji
1989:94). Jack Donelly's warng is echoing the political opposition in a
number of Afrcan countres:
(W)hile recognizing the legiumate c1aims of self-deterounation and
cultural relativism. we must be alert to cynical manipulauons of a dying,
lost or even mythical cultura past.... Arguments of cultura relativism are
far too often made by econoouc and poliucal elites that have long since
left traditional culture behind (Donnelly 1984:441).
Does the Banjul charer challenge the universality of the International Bil
of Human Rights - or is the Afrcan decIaration per se a Western product?
A more thorough analysis of ths question would require thorough legal-
sociological analyses of both traditional Afrcan court rulings, as well as of
the legislation and practice during colonial times. We wil not pursue this
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question here, allowing it to serve as a remInder that a diffs ion of ideas
does not necessarily mean that the ideas become universal norms.
Islam and human rightslS
According to traditional and fundamentaist interpretations of Islam, God
is not bound by anytng. The wil of God is the cause of everything and
the law of God the only norm. In this world view, there is no room for an
autonomous individual, and human rights are at best superfuous human
supplements to the law of God - shari' a; at worst rebeIlous attempts tò
replace the law of God with the work of man.
An analysis of the development of the idea of human rights shows that
it is closely linked to the vie w of the individual which emerged in Europe
and Nortern America durng the Renaissance and was established during
Enlightenment (Cf. following chapter). The idea of human rights developed
as par of the process of modemisation and secularisation in the Western
world. The Islamc world view, with God as centre of everything, makes
it diffcult to deduce modern human rights without a comprehensive
reinterpretation of Islam as a religious system.
When we are dealing with Islam and human rights, it is important to be
aware of the difference between the "Arab" and "Islainc". The Arab world
constitutes a relatively homogenous region when it comes to language and
culture, with Islam as the crucial element, while the Islamc world reaches
from the Atlantic Ocean to Indonesia, embracing a number of languages
and nationalities. The Arab countres, although only one par of the IslamIc
world, are our main concern here. Countres with a Muslim maj ori t y have
endorsed several conventions and declarations, simultaneously makng
several attempts to present comprehensive /slamic answers to the challenge
of human rights. In spite of increasing fundamentalism and IslamIst
movements, many Muslim intellectuals, as well as sections of the Arab
public opinion, show a deep awareness of human rights.
The Arab League presented a draft for a human nghts convention in
1970, 10 year before the Banjul declaration, but it has not yet been ratified
by any of the member countres (Arri 1987:7). Five of nine Arab countres
in Afrca adhere to the Afrcan charer. This could be interpreted as
evidence that there is no conflct between Arabic culture and acceptance of
the UN charer and conventions. However, on ly 10 of the 20 members of
theArab League have ratified the two human rights conventions of 1966,
15 This section draws on Gule (1991), cf. also Gule (1992).
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and it is too early to tell whether The Arab League or any of the Arab
states wil subscribe to the Arab human rights document.16
Lack of commtment to human rights on the state level, combined with
extensive repression, has limIted the development of volunta human rights
organisations. But in spite of the repression, some such organisations have
emerged in the varous Arab states. In addition, there are inter-Arabic
organisations, such as the Arab Lawyers Union and the Arab Organisation
for Human Rights. At a conference in 1986, a number of private individuals
with different backgrounds, including lawyers, judges, joumalists and social
scientists, drafted an Arab human rights charer.
The Arab Charer of Human Rights is, analogous to the Afrcan Charer,
founded on an Arab historic and cultual context. The codification is mainly
inspired by the- IntemationalBil of Human Rights, but has some unique
features. For example, ar. 34 states that the purpose of education and
culture is to develop the personality and to strengten the belief in Arab
unity. AricIe 2.3 provides an openingfor the use of death penalty, with the
precondition that the sentence is passed by an authorised cour of law and
that the sentenced person has the right to appeaL. ArcIe 9 codifies freedom
of thought and belief, but wars of certn IimItations (9.2).
The present drafs for IslamIc declarations ar characterisedby the
attempt to haroni se modern human rights.with the law of God - shari'a
_ at the same time retaining the shari' a as the main guideline for all rights
interpretations. It is, however, problematic to merge opposites such as the
shari' a on the one hand - involving legal subordination of women and
non-Muslims, and punishments such as stoning and amputation - and
modern human rights on theother.
Fundamentalistically oriented Muslims wil argue that the Human Rights
must be changed in order to accommodate Islam, and not the other way
around. But even though some Islamc positions completely reject human
rights, there are, as mentioned before, Islamc intellectuals who tae human
rights seriously, and who argue that human rights are already present within
Islam, or are protected by Islam. It is therefore possible to compose Islamc
declarations in a modem human rights language. As wil be shown in the
next chapter, there are also Muslim intellectuals who cIaim that the human
rights principles are so important that Islam ought to be reinterpreted in
order toremove the differences. These are of ten people of higher education
16 These are figures from 1990. Since the merging of Nort- and South Yemen in the
spring of 1990. the number wil be 9 if the convention is also ratified by the common
state.
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and of Western orientation - and curently they represent on ly a small
mInority in the Islamc world.
There are certnly conflcts between Islam and modem human rights
thinking, but the attempts by MuslIms themselves to haronise,
demonstrate that human rights also appeal to Islamc peoples. Therefore,
there is reason to hope that the conflct between Islam and modern human
rights may in the long term be sol ved though a process of reinterpretation
of certain elements of Islamc ortodoxy (Cf. An-Na'im 1990 and 1992).
Regional human rights or universal norms
In view of ths discussion of the Afrcan Banjul declaration and various
Arab and Islamc human rights initiatives, there is reason to ask: To what
extent do these initiatives represent a general criticism of the concept of
universal Human Rights, and specifically of the International Bil of Human
Rights?
Both the African declaration and the Arabian draft use cultural and
historical regional characteristics as a point of reference. By referrng to
culture and tradition, both documents limIt somewhat the individual rights
guaranteed in the International Bil of HUIlan Rights. Also, more emphasis
is given to collective rights, as well as to social, economIc and cultural
rights than in the "Western" document. This may be seen as criticism of the
individualism that characterises human rights norms in the Western
tradition. Both the Arab and the African charers are, however, based on the
International Declaration of Human Rights, and acknowledge its basic
rights. We have also seen that there is a growing conviction within IslamIc
circles that Islam wil have to be reinterpreted if respect for human rights
is to be incorporated.
From the point of view of the human rights movement, this represents a
positive development. Especially so the Afrcan charer, which has already
been ratified. These regional human rights documents acknowledge human
rights to a certain extent, on the basis of their own cultures, not simply as
ideas imposed from the outside. These documents are also an expression of
a deepening commtment to human rights in this par of the world.
The African human rights declaration, the Arab draft, as well as more
recent Islamic thoughi,all contai both adherence to the idea of human
rights and criticism of certain features of "The International Bil of Human
Rights", which is conceived as being specifically Western and
"unintellgible" from .the point of view of the Afrcan and ArablIslamIc
culture. These documents thus challenge both universalists who claim that
the individual human rights (and only these) are universally valid, as well
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as cultural relativists, who argue that it is impossible to make normative
standards that are viable beyond the single society/community.
The question of the universal viabilty of human rights wiI be our topic
in the following chapter. It wiI be considered from thee points of view:
On the one hand there are moral philosophical arguments cIaimIng that
"Western" individual human rights are universally valid, independent of 
the
origin of the rights. On the other hand, the social anthopologists reject any
idea of universal norms. In the field of tension between the two stands,
there is the "political realty" where, as ths chapter has shown, there is a
growing support for certai human rights norms, and disagreement about
others: Rights instrments that are developed in the "non-Western" world
adhere to the universal documents, but at the same time they attch
importce to social, economIc and cultural as well as collective rights in
addition to and in competition with individual human rights.
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2. The legitimacy of human rights
The universal legitimacy of human rights norms is the theme of this
chapter. In the previouschapter we have seen how humanrights are firy
established in several international and regional human rights instrments,
and how the UN Declaration of Human Rights and humanrights
conventions have attaned the status of common norm of the world
community - The International Bil of Human Rights.
Butalthough internationally accepted documents establish certain
fundamental human rights that apply to all human beings, the content of
the se rights and their priority over other societal concerns, is disputed.
PoliticaIly, ths debate was more heated during the cold war, but the
question of the universal legitimacy of human rights is in a sense even
more acute in the current international situation. Until the decline of the
socialist block, the international stalemate functioned as a barer against
attempts to "enforce" human rights standards as defined by one
politicallcultural tradition, in the world community. In the current unipolar
situation, human rights are becomIng powerfl political instrments,
standards whereby a Western domInated worId community passes
judgement and takes political action. This places a heavy burden of
responsibility on human rights research. Jf it is to maintain its integrty, it
is vital that researchers do not uncritically follow the political lead. The
role of human rights in foreign policy wil be discussed in chapter 5. For
now it suffices to note that as human rights are increasingly used as
normative standards in the evaluation of political regimes and as a basis for
decision-makng in foreign policy, the universality of the humanrights
norms should be placedon the agenda.
We have already noted that the universality of the International Bil of
Human Rights is contested. Critics have dismIssed it as a purely Western
product; which other cultures have been forced to concede to. There are
Muslim leaders arguing that the entire international human rights project is
no more than Western chauvinism and cultural imperialism. In paricular
in Asia, there is growing discontent with what is se en as an attempt to
impose Western values on non-Western societies. At the September 1992
summtmeeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Jakara, the final
communique, supported by more than one hundred countres, stated that
"No countr '.. should use its power to dictate its concept of democracyand
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human rights or impose conditionalities on others" (Human Rights Watch
1992/4:8).17 The crux of ths criticism is also maintaned by scholars.
Radical cultural relativists reject any possibilty of universal norms
whatsoever. And withn social anthopology, where cultual relativism is a
fundamenta scientific perspective, there are strong objections against
awarding human rights the status of universal norms.
The rejection of universal rights represents an importt cha1lenge to the
evaluation of human rights respect in non- Western societies. If the cultural
relativistic criticism cannot be convincingly rejected, it is diffcult to defend
policies where the legitimacy of states and systems of government are made
contingent on their human rights penormance.
The aim of this chapter is to shed criticallight on the objections against
the universal validity of human rights. and discuss how these criticisms
may be met.
Following a short introduction, outlining the history of the idea of human
rights, we wil show how varous categories of rights are rooted in different
ideological traditions. Next, a model of the legal-historical development of
rights norms is presented: Why did civic rights develop in Europe? And to
what extent are these preconditions for the establishment of rights
applicable in non-European states? Subsequently, the philosophical validity
of the norms. as well as the criticisms of universal rights by cultural
relativists, wil be examned. The last section of this chapter attempts to
bridge the gap between these two perspectives. Is it possible to justify the
universal validity of human rights, given the pluralism of our time? We wil
argue that the most promIsing approaches to this problem centreupon the
idea of an overIapping consensus (Rawls 1987, An Na'im 1990 and 1991,
Lindholm 1992).
The emergence of the human rights idea
The human rights idea iscommonly traced back to the seventeenth and
eighteenth century, to the doctrnes of the natural rights of man. In earlier
times, individual rights, in the sen se of having "a right to something", was
not separated from "what is right", meaning the correct thing to do in
relation to a divine or actually existing law . Man was seen as an element
of a divine order. In the 16-17oos the view emerged that society was based
on a contract between individuals, having both rights and duties. John
17 For a review of objections voiced by non-Western nations to what is perceìved as
Western human rights ideology. cf. Holleman (1987. pp. 13-27).
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Locke is of ten considered to be the first exponent of the idea of natural
individual rights, with his work Two Treaties on Government (1689).18
One hundred year later the idea of individual rights found expression in
important political documents such as . the American DecIaration of
Independence (1776) and the French DecIaration of Human Rights (1789).
The human rights concept has a long history of being used as a political
slogan, and in. the course of ths process the content of the concept has
changed. It has been expanded to cover areas which in many ways have
liule in common with the French and American declarations.
At the coreof natural rights 'thnkng is the idea that each individual has
certain inherent rights. These rights are connected.to human nature, in "the
state of natue" , i.e. in a (hypothetical) situation where the institutions of
the state do not exist. The natural rights are, from a moral point of view,
more fundamenta than the existing laws of society. The laws of society
are, according to ths perspective, only legitimate to the extent that they
respect the natural rights of citizens.
Three ideological traditions and three categories of rights
The idea of human rights is cIosely related to the concept of equality; all
human beings are equal, morally speakng. As humans we are of equal
value or dignity and are thus entitled to equal rights. Fundamental human
rights have been claimed on the basis of thee different conditions, each in
its way caring a theat to the dignity of man. In short, we may say that
what is threatened is our libert, our autonomy and the satisfaction of
fundamental needs. Each of the se concerns is related toa specific
ideological tradition, in which a parcular category of rights . is rooted.
The liberal tradition, originating in Locke's social contract theory of
natural rights, has primarly been concemed with securing the individual
sphere of liberty . This sphere of liberty (the suum-sphere) is defined
18 The first thinker to make use of the ~oncept ius, in the sense of individual nghts, and
thus to a cenan extent causing the concept to be freed. from the idea of a divine or
public law, was probably Jean Gersen, a French academic in the fourteenth century. He
distinguished between ius, "a facultas or power appropnate to someone and in
accordance with the dictates of nght reason" and lex, "a practical and nght reason to
which the movements and workings of thngs are directed towards their ordained ends"
(Tucks i 979). However, it was only toward the end of the seventeenth century that the
idea of the natural nghts of man was given a centr position within European
philosophy. For a presentation of the tradition of natural nghts, see Waldron (1984),
Syse (1993).
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somewhat differently by the different thnkers within this tradition, but is
generally seen to include life, body, property, freedom of belief and action,
and dignity. The right to property is considered to be among the
fundamental natual rights and is deduced from the right to life (Cf. Nozick
1974). The libert of the individual may be encroached upon by other
individuals as well as by the state. In order to prevent infrngements of
these liberties, the state must be bound by the constitution and its main task
should be the safeguarding of the personal and civil rights of its citizens.
The liberal tradition thus speak in favour of a constitutional state, limIted
state authority, and respect for the personal and civil rights of the
individuaL. The liberalistic idea that libert of the individual willimit state
power, has in recent years been arculated by among others Robert Nozick
(1974) and Ronald Dworkin (1977).
The democratie tradition, inspired by Jean-Jaques Rousseau, is founded
on another concept of the libert of man: liberty in the sense of autonomy
or self-determation. Man is autonomous only it he follows his own rules.
The autonomy of the individual is realised though parcipation in the
collective decisions of political life. According to ths view, the right to
political parcipation is of vital importce for the realisation of human
dignity. The central question within the democratic tradition is: "Who
governs me?", as opposed to the liberalistic tradition: "to what extent do
the authorities interfere with my life?". There is atension between the
democratic demand for political rights and liberal demands for liberty rights
and a stable constitutional government (Elster and Slagstad 1988).
The third concern giving rise to demands for rights is the fundamental
human need for weIl-being. Being of equal value we all have the same
rights to satisfaction of our basic material needs. This is the basis of the
socialist tradition, and in contemporar thinking on rights and distrbutive
justice the se ideas are widespread.19 Modern contractaran theories (which
also draw on the liberal and democratic traditions) elaborate on this line of
thought: Cooperation in an orderly community creates an economIc surplus.
As all human beings in a society tae par in the community that enables
the production of goods and services, we all have a right to our share of the
goods (Rawls 1971). The existence of a state thus fuers claims for a
distrbution of resources which is such that no-one is left worse off than
they would be in a situation without cooperation. In other words; it
provides all citizens with the rights to social and economic we lfa re.
The American Dec1aration of Independence and the French Declaration
of Human Rights from the late 1700s, only c1aimed civil and political
19 See e.g. Rawls (1971), Sen (1985), Føllesdal (1992).
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rights. In the human rights documents of our time, social, economIc and
cultual rights have been given an indisputable and, according to UN
policy, equally importt position. The normative status of these rights are,
however, still in dispute. In the human rights debate, the possibilties of a
philosophically valid justification of welfare rights, have been a central
issue.
The origin and development of the human rights idea may also be
addressed from a more functional perspective: under which conditions did
the rights emerge, and to what extent are these general requirements for the
rights norms to develop and become institutional?
The development of rights from the perspective of political
science
An explanation of the historical development of rights is set fort in the
stage theory developed by Richard P. Claude (1976). Based on the works
of T. S. MarshalI and the political sociology of Stein Rokkan, Claude
designed a model for the legal-historical development of rights norms
(MarshalI 1954, Rokkan 1973). He sta out with four categories of rights,
and demonstrates how each category may be seen as a result of certain
conditions at different stages of European history.
The study of the historical emergence of rights norms has two aims. One
is to give an account of the historical processes that resulted in the
development of rights norms in Europe - to explain under what conditions
the conceptions appeared and how they developed from a core of norms
into a set of rules covering most areas of human existence. The second aim
is to find out whether these are general terms that are required for the
development and institutionalisation of the rights norms to tae place in any
society.20
CIaude specifies one background condition and four stages in a
development process. The precondition is a secure and procedurally
regulated legal system; i.e. a system with a certn degree of predictabiIty,
certn fundamenta norms and certn procedures for settling conflicts.
In the first stage, fundamental personal Iiberties are defined. Based on a
secularsed and universalistic view of the legitimacy of the state, "the
private" came to be separate from "the public". The idea emerged that
every single individual has a right to a sphere of liberty; a private sphere
where the authorities cannot legitimately trespass. A change in the views
20 For a discussion of Claude's model cf. Stokke 1988.
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on legitimate authority is an ideological precondition for thelimItation of
political power (institutionalisation of the principle of division of power).
In thesecond stage, the civil rights are defined. This stage is
characterised by demands for legal guarantees for the individual, and
coincides, historically, with the emergence of the bourgeoisie and the
development of a modern, capitalistic market economy. The view of the
individual and the role of the authorities is changed; the individual is
perceivedas enterprising and active, while the authorities are se 
en as
correspondingly passive. Their role is simply to guarantee the liberty,
property and securty of the citizens. The French Declaration of the Rights
of Man and of the Citizen may be said to representthis stage. The contours
of a liberal constitutional state are vaguely visible, where liberty is defined
as "the freedom to do all that does not injure others" and where the laws
are designed to prohibit actions harl to society. Political life is
conceived as a market where the acts of the individual, motivated by his
own interest, indirectly wil lead to the common good.
In the third stage, legal equalty is extended to incIude political equality.
The introduction of universal suffage belongs here.CIaude explains the
institutionalisation of equal political rights as a result of an elite strategy to
prevent socially based conflcts. He draws on T .H. Marshall, among others,
in claimIng that granting political citizenship to the lower classes cushioned
the effects of a sharly divided cIass system (Marshall 1954).21 This
period is characterised by the organisation of politicalactivity in pari 
es,
volunta organisations, trade unions, etc. The view of political life
changes, from the idea of a market where the free scope of individuals
brings out the common good, to an arena for intergroup negotiations.
In thefourth stage, the spectre ofrights is expanded toincIude social and
economIc goods. The two first stages were primarly concerned with
establishing negative rights, limIting the authority of the state; this stage,
however, focuses on the positive obligation of the state to secure the social
'goods the individual may not acquire without help. CIaude cIaims that an
ideological requisite for the development of welfare rights is the realisation
that everybody must share the risk of the industral development. . The
welfare rights established durng this stage, are more conditional than the
earlier rights. EconomIc potential, admInistrative capacity and political wil,
21 This is. however, not an uncontroversial point of view. Otherauthors have pointed out
the imponace of political mobilsation, primarly through the labour movement, and
have to a greater extent explained the expansion of rights as a result of pressure from
below. See e.g. Przeworski (1985) and Vester (1970).
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are importnt preconditions for a realisation of social and economIc rights.
Central planning of public activities is also importt at this stage.
By means of ths model, the emergence of personal libeny rights, civil
rights, right to political parcipation and social and economIc welfare rights
are presented as civic rights. It we study each stage, and the entie
development process, we see that the rights of the DecIaration of Human
Rights of 1948, may be seen as a product of this Euro-American
development. In the last two stages, the rights are extended to a gradually
larger par of the population, and the effort to establish universal human
rights may be seen as a natual continuation of ths process.
Claude' s cIassical model of human rights development is an ideal type
in the Weberian sense, and expresses an exemplar development path,
based on the history of certain countres. Such generalisations invarably
imply simplifications. Neverteless, it seems that Claude has managed to
visualise and strcture importt elements in the Euro-American
development of rights norm. His model explais rights developments as
the result of internal processes. Ths is, however, only one par of the
picture; diffsion of norms must also be taen into consideration.
Conceptions of rights, as other norms of a society, are influenced by the
outside world, not simply a result of internal development processes. Ideas
are continually being diffsed, and in our society this diffsion happens
faster than ever. The diffusion aspect, which is not a par of Claude's
model, is paricularly importt in the curent development of rights in non-
European countres. The explanatory model may, neverteless, function as
a basis for hypotheses on the premIses that must be fulfilled for the
development and institutionalisation of human rights norms.
We concluded above that the adoption of the UN Declaration of Human
Rights in 1948 may beseen as the culmInation of 300 years of rights
development in the Euro-American cultural area, and that the International
Bil of Human Rights is an expression of ideasrooted in Western culture
and philosophy. With ths perspective in mInd, human rights may be
regarded as an expon of purely Western ideas. Claude's model of human
rights also demonstrates how modem "universal human rights" are a
product of Western historical development. At the same time it adds an
interesting dimension: The establishment of legal stadards is a reaction to
economIc and social conditions during the development of any modern
society. In this perspective, the modernisation that is taking place
thoughout the world, is a process that wil require and enable the
establishment of legal standards. A relevant question is,then: Are the
present economIc and social conditions in non-Western countres equivalent
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to the conditions in Europe durng the period when the idea of rights
emerged?
The application of Claude's model to the study of preconditions for
rights development in other cultues wil not be pursued here. What is
importt, for our puroses, is that it demonstrates how human rights may
be seen as par of a specific historical development in Europe, and that the
rights responded to problems which are today found thoughout the worId.
To sum up our discussion so far: Human rights are products of European
philosophy of the 17th and 18th centures, developed and arculated
through Westem ideological schools of thought. What was adopted by the
UN as universal human rights in 1948, is cIosely linked to developments
within European society. According to Claude, the emergence and
institutionalisatIon of rights norm is determned byhistorical factors, and
other cultural and historical contexts wil have simlar influence on the
development of rights and dutIes. If we accept that different cultural
contexts produce different concepts of rights, is it possible to maintan that
certn norms are universally valid? Concretely, may The Intemational Bil
of Human Rights cIaim universal validity?
Is there anacceptable justication of universal human
rights?
Does the historical origins of the human rights afect their universal
validity? Can norms that are the products of one culture claim validity in
other cultures? Do other cultures have elements that support the human
rights idea?
Two ideal types or extreme positions may be used to ilustrate the
question of universal validity of human rights. The universalistic position,
of ten adopted in moral philosophy, maintains that the origin ofa. norm is
of no concern for its validity: The validity of human rights depends on a
satisfactory phil os ophic al justification. The cultural context within which
they emerged and developed, is of no interest. On the opposite end of the
scale, we find the cultual relativistic position. Cultural relativism is often
advocated by social anthopologists, but is also supported by some
philosophical traditions.22 Radical relativism argue that universal norms
are an impossibilty, and that a society can only be understood and assessed
on the basis of its own normative stadards.
"
-- E.g. among scholar within the Communitaan tradition in contemporar political
philosophy. (Cf. Waltzer 1988, Sandel 1982, Kymlica 1989).
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We wiI now present the most importt philosophical strategies for
justification of universal human rights, and then deal with the criticism
presented by cultural relativism. Is it possible to find justification strategies
for human rights norm that are comprehensible and acceptable to different
cultural contexts? An outline of varous attmpts to straddle the gap
between the universalistic and cultural relativistIc perspectives wiI concIude
the chapter.
A philosophical justification of human rights
The traditional position in moral philosophy is the universalistie, that is, the
historical emergence of rights is con~idered IIelevant in relation to the
validity of the rights. Jf human rights may be philosophically justified, they
are also universally valid. The philosophical Iiterature on the validityof
human rights is enormous, especially since the flourshing interest for the
subject in the 1970s. We wiI not describe the positions in detal, but only
present a rough outline of the most.central justification strategies.
The most common strategy is to justify the universality ofhuman rights
byresortng to the argument of natural rights: Human rights are universal
because they protect values shared by all human beings; values rooted in
a common human nature. There are two main opinions on what this
"something" called "human nature" is, that merits claims to special
protection: Firstly, rights may be deri ved from a conception of the moral
nature of man, rooted in the normative premise that all men enjoy a moral
freedom that "makes man human". This freedom is the origin of the human
dignity that needs to be protected though basic rights (Cf. Donelly 1985,
Syse 1993). These strategi es based on natural rights may justify civil and
political rights, but faces problems when it comes to welfare rights.
A second possibilty is to found human rights on basic human needs.
Human rights, incIuding rights to a basic level of welfare, may be justified
as being crucial for satisfying the needs common to all human beings (cf.
Føllesdal 1992, Sen 1985). Achallenge facing strategies based on need, is
how to make a theoretically valid transition from "is" (actual needs) to
"ought" (morally binding rights) (Cf. Tranøy 1975).
A philosophical justification for human rights is also sought in contra et
theory. This strategy may be outlined as follows: For a social organisation
or state to be legitimate, one must be able to imagine that every member
of the society would have entered into it voluntarly. An organised society
has its advantages; an economIc surlus is created that would not otherwise
have existed. For people to voluntaly enter into a "social contract" ,
nobody should be worse off than they would have been without it. This
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means that everybody must have their share of the surplus, implying respect
and protection of personal libertes, civil and political rights, and
distrbution of social and economIc goods that ensures the fulfiment of
basic needs (cf. Rawls, 1971).
These justification strategi es, whether based on natual rights or contract
theory, focus on the individual as the only rights-caring unit, and
collective rights are rejected. Whle strategies based on natural rights end
up with a small range of basic rights, and are hardly suffcient to justify the
entire range of rights incIuded in the International Bil of Human Rights,
the approach based on contract theory faces the opposite problem: it tends
to justify toa much, and it is diffcult to isolate basic values that must be
protected by basic rights. Ths type of justifications relates rights to the
ordering of society: civic rights rather than universal human rights, are
justified.
Attempts have been made, however, to develop contractual justifications
on a globallevel (C.f. Beitz 1979, 1981 and Føllesdal 1991, 1992). Given
the present international economIc strctures and the increased global
interaction and dependence, it is argued that state borders are only of
limIted moral significance: Political and economIc decisions of one state
often have effects (e.g. environmenta) on the citizens of other states. As
we are all par of the global society, sharng the risks and strains of
economIc interaction, we all have a moral claim to codetermnation, rights
protection and a certn share of the surlus.
The philosophical positions outlined above - natural rights and contract
theories - regard the historical development of human rights norms as
irrelevant to the question of validity. However, the premIses underIying
these arguments are disputed. Criticism have been parcularly vigourous
from social anthopologists.
Cultural relativism and the idea of universal rights
Cultural relativism is a widely agreed upon ideal within social
anthropology. Put simply, it means that it is not legitimate to pass
judgement on the social practice of other cultures. Each paricular culture
is the only possible basis for assessment of moral rights and norms. This
argument is based on the assumption that the individual is socially created:
"There is nothng in him that is not a product of interaction among
individuals, groups, classes, societIes" (Lefebre 1986). Man is reduced to
a carer of socially defined rules of the specificsocial community.
This idea, that the individual is a reflection of his society and culture, is
sharly opposed to the idea that human beings are - by nature and
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independent of society - free and equal individuals. It man is a merelya
product of environment and cultue, and all moral norms are relative to the
culture at issue, universal human rights cannot be justified. There are no
standards by which one may measure norm cross-cultually. The practice
of one culture may not be assessed on the basis of the (human rights)
norms of another.
Cultural relativism is an importt ideal for an empircal science
attempting to understand the way of thnking and living of other cultures.
The final consequence of this position is, however, that a normative
evaluation of the social practice of other cultures is impossible.
Radical cultural relativism, claimIng that the search for a common
morality and common rights norm in itself is culturally dependent, leaves
no room for understanding why there are differences. A formal objection
against ths radical relativism is that it faces a problem of self-reference: the
argument that cultues are incomparable cIaims universal validity. At the
same time - if ths is correct - this argument (like all arguments) is
contingent on its own cultural background, and may therefore not cIaim
universal validity. An extreme cultura relativism wil thus undermne its
own position (C.f. HolIes & Lukes 1982, and Jarie 1984). It everything
cultural is relative, ths must also apply to statements describing these
differences.
Cultural relativism as an anthopological method does not, however,
necessarly imply moral relativism. The range vares from "radical cultural
relativists" to "contextualists". The latter interpretation underIines that
cultural relativism as a method should not paràlyse the anthopologists's
ability to make ethical judgements. Cultual relativism is a guideline, rather
than a dictate for scientific work; it should serve as a constant remInder that
before judgement is passed on a cultual practice, the context and the
conditions for human actions must be cIosely studied, understood and
considered (Cf. Barett .1988).
Stil, the implicit premIse of anthopology has generally been that it is
not possible to violate rights that do not exist - that is, if they are not
conceived as rights within the relevant culture (Downing et aL. 1988: 126).
Attempts to bridge the gap
Three elements may now serve as a framework for our discussion: Firstly,
what we may call "the political reality": The International DecIaration of
Human Rights of 1948 has status as common norm for all UN nations. For
states to be accepted within the international community, a certn
recognition of and respect for basic human rights is required. Stil, regional
26
human rights instrments such as the Afrcan Banjul charer - while
pledging allegiance to the human rights ideal - question the priority of the
different rights categories, and especially so, the dOmInating position of
individual rights. The second element is the philosophical justification of
human rights as universal norm, based on what is "common to all human
beings" independent of cultural context. Finally, there is the rejection by
cultural relativists, of the idea that universal norm may be agreed upon,
and function as a legitimate stadard according to which the practice of
different cultures can be assessed.
As we have seen, each of the elements have weakesses, but neither can
be dismIssed. They mutually challenge one another. The widespread
acceptance of human rights in the international community - their
(apparent) legitimacy as a constitutive par of rights concepts in par of the
worId where the cultual context is very different from their context of
origin - challenges radical cultual relativism.
That there is "somethg" common to all men in all cultures, and that
this "somethng" entitles man to cert rights, is an ide a which
increasingly seems to appeal to people thoughout the world - perhaps
because the world is actually becomIng more uniform, as a consequence of
better communications and mutual influence.
At the same time, cultual relativism effectively criticises the
philosophical view of man and human natue as an unchangeable en tit y
existing independently of society. And the fact that different cultural
traditions seem to emphasise different categories of rights, to a certin
extent seem to support this criticism. However, the cultural relativistic view
of man raises problems of its own, claimIng that the individual is nothing
more than a role in society. The apparent incompatibility of the se positions,
combined with the increasingly importt political position of human rights,
have caused scholars from both quarers to search for new solutions.
As noted above, moral relativism and the rejection of human rights
, norms that may be cross-culturally valid, does not necessarly flow from
cultual relativism as a scientific ideal. Assuming that it is in fact possible
to communicate across cultures - to identify with other patterns of ideas,
norms and rules - the Norwegian anthopologist Harald Tambs-Lyche
concludes that the socially created person is not the totality of a human
being. "The abstract individual mayvery well be a fiction, but the
experience that I - the subject andme - the role, my position in society,
are not indistinguishable, seems to be universal" (Tambs-Lyche 1988:114,
our translation). On this basis, he deduces the following social
anthopological perspective of universal human rights: The ideas inherent
in human rights as they are formulated at present, with one paricular
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culture as their philosophical basis, can never become trly cross;.cultural.
The human rights norms as they exist today may, however, be seen as the
W esternculture' s contrbution to a global discussion aimed at developing
customs built on mutual respect.
To formulate rights - as well as duues - towards the subject with
whom we are comrunicaung and who we. understad across cultural
barers, is a diffcult task. Norms and rules, rights andduues, are a part
of the cultural barers that separate us. On the other hand, we do seem
to be able to discuss, to communicate the rules of the game, rights and
duties, across these barers (Tambs-Lyche 1988:115).
A paraIlel position is found in the works of the Arabic lawyer - and
newly appointed director of Afrca Watch - Abdullah Ahmed An-Na'im
(An-Na'im 1990, 1992). He underscores the needfor universally valid
human rights, and emphasises the significance of the present international
human rights norms. An-Na'im does, however, (although not as strongly as
Tambs-Lyche) express doubts about the likelihood of the existing
international norms attning genuine universality.
An-Na'im advocates a reinterpretive approach, and proposes a
methodology for the reform of cultuaIreligious traditions in general, and
Islam in parcular, in accordance with internationally accepted human
rights norms. His strategy for promoting universal human rights is a process
of internal, as weIl as cross-cultural discussions. The present international
norms are regarded as an indispensable framework. Even though they
cannot be considered universal, they nevertheless reflect and represent a
certn degree of global unit y which is crucial for the development of
genuinely universal human rights.
Thoughan intern al legitimation process, the human rights norms should
as far as possible be justified and supported on. the basis of the norms of
each single cultue. The intemal discussion is influenced by, and in its turn
influences other cultures though a paralleI, cross-cultural dialogue. In tie,
the cultually specific view of human rights wil be modified, as wil the
con tent of the global unit y . The idea is that such dynamcs, based on the
ambiguities and controversies of each culture, possibly wil result in a
genuin el y universal concept of human rights (An-Na'im 1990 and 1992).
While Tambs-Lyche and An-Na'im both support the idea of universal
human rights norms, they do not (at least not Tambs-Lyche) see the rights
expressed in current human rights documents as universaL. Other positions,
arguing in a simIlar manner that universal human rights must be based on
an overIapping consensus between cultures, are more explicitly commtted
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to the idea of human rights as expressed in the International Bil of Human
Rights.
The Norwegian philosopher Tore Lindholm - drawing on John Rawls'
political theory of the idea of an overlapping consensus - argues that an
acceptable justification of modem human rights must tae as its basic
premIse the fundamenta political pluralism of the present worId. Modern
socIeties are characterised by a lack of material resources and by religious,
moral, economIc and political pluralism - continuously causing conflicts.
Rights are legitimIsed as protection against socially produced theats, as an
answer to the circumstances of justice. Human rights norms and an
apparatus for the implementation of these rights, are necessar as result of
the "conditions of justice" in a pluralistic world community.
According to Lindholm, a promIsing example of such a justification
strategy is found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights itself
(Lindholm 1992). The UN discussed - and rejected - different
justifications for the rights, and settled for a listig of certn fundamental
principles, summed up as follows: "All men are born free and equal in
dignity and rights." These normative statements may be supported by
deeper premIses in different religious, metaphysical, cultural and ideological
traditions. Although the premIses of the different cultures and ideologies
may be reciprocally incompatible, each of them may in its own way
support the fundamental values expressed in the declaration - on their own
terms they may concIude that all men are born free and equal in dignity
and rights. Human rights are thus justified by an "overlapping consensus"
about a certn conception of the person.23
Two sets of premIses underIie this strategy: The normative premIses,
establishing the principle of inherent libertyand equal dignity for all human
beings; and the descriptive premIses, establishing that the worId society has
developed in a direction where inherent liberty and equal dignity for all
human beings may only be realised though a widely accepted global
human rights regime.
Lindholm . puts forward this strategy as a "secularsed heir" of. the
classical natual rights tradition. An heir that - by being sensitive to
differences in normative traditions and levels of development and wealth
- may provide cultures without rights traditions with a rationale for
accepting fundamental human rights and libertes. He argues that the
implicit justification strategy of the W orId Declaration is open to all
religious, metaphysical and ideological traditions recognizing the liberty and
23 Doubts are expressed, however, as to whether such a minimal approach is suffcient to
justify the totality of human rights (Syse 1993).
29
equality of all human beings. On the other hand, it excludes,or demands
normative reform of traditions that do not support the idea of libert and
equality. It is both pluralistic and critical - it is open, but not without a
sting (Lindholm 1989)
Concluding remarks
Are these attempts to straddle the gap successful? They are, in some
respects. A consensus is emerging on the need for human rights in the
modern world. The idea of universal human rights enjoy widespread
legitimacy as a solution to universal problems.These rights can no longer
be justified by references to Man' s Universal, Eternal and Unchangeable
Nature, the way it is done within the Western philosophy of natural rights.
Instead, a "consensus about consensus" is emerging: In spite of importnt
social, religious and cultual differences, it may be possible to develop a
global respect for and acknowledgement of certn basic rights - rights
common to all individuals in all states by vIre of being human beings.
The justification of the se universal rights is, however, not in itself
universaL. It is suffcient that "the product" - human rights - can be
justified on the basis of the fundamental "trths" within each culture.
The new conventional wisdom is thus that human rights must have a
basis that is "open", "tolerant", "dialogical"; a basis that can function as an
"overlapping consensus" between differing political, cultural and religious
points of view. Lindholm's claim is that this overlapping consensus is
already expressed in the dec1aration of human rights, while An-Na'im's
opinion is that the declaration is an inherently Western contrbution to the
dialogue, which is already underway.
However, this basic insight, that political agreement on human rights
requires deliberate philosophical shaIlowness, is not new. As early as in
1949, Jaques Martain stated that the UN Declaration of Human Rights
could not be adopted until all paries agreed not to discuss why all human
beings have certn rights. Diverging justifications of the rights could,
however, result in consensus about the contents of the rights (Martan
1949).
Should human rights be regarded as universally valid norm?
Justifications based on the idea of overlapping consensus seem to provide
a suffcient normative basis for the idea of universal human rights, meaning
rights that apply to all human beings in all states. The rights cannot,
however, be claimed universal in the sense of "eternal" and
"unchangeable". Given that it is based on an overIapping consensus, there
wil always be the possibilty that the con tent of this consensus may
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change. The justification is also limited in another respect. It is essential,
if ths strategy is to provide a valid justification for universal norm, that
a cross-cultural consensus does in fact exist. And what is justified is the
con tent of the overlapping consensus in its totaity - which is not
necessarly the currently prevailing interpretation of human rights in our
Westem cultue.
Ths does not mean that human rights should not be used as a cross-
cultural stadard. On the contrar, as an object of international consensus
it should be promoted. However, the conditional natue of the legitimation
of universal human rights bids us to be cautious. While it is legitimate to
employ human rights as universal stadards, both in research and in policies
of aid, to dictate a purely Western liberal concept of rights, is not
necessarly legitimate.
So far, our concern has been the development of international human
rights norms and the question of their universality. Whle these issues are
important to keep in mInd in the curent situation where the hegemony of
Westem liberal ideas is considerable, and human rights figure promInentlY
in foreign policy, there are other issues of more immediate relevance to the
promotion of human rights. In the following two chapters we wiI consider
some of the central debates: What is the relationship between human rights
and economIcdevelopment? Do civil and political rights hinder or promote
the realisation of social and economic rights? Are democratic forms of
government a suffcient condition for human rights respect - and a
necessar condition? Is it possible for all societies to'become democratic?
A responsible strategy for promoting human rights in foreign policy must
take the se questions into consideration.
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3. Trade-off controversies: Human rights
or development?
Trade-off arguments are based on the assumption that human rights and
economIc growth are conflcting considerations. Jf developing countres are
to achieve a rapid growth rate, certn political and/or economIc rights must
be sacrificed. Trade-off arguments also refer to conflct between different
categories of rights incIuded in the International Bil of Human Rights.
In the 1960s and -70s in parcular, many analysts maintained that
political authoritaanism was a necessar condition for the establishment
of rationalised, effective admInistration and for economIc growth: When the
objective is economIc development, civil and political rights have to yield.
It was also commonly argued that economIc inequality is necessar in order
to promote industralisation and growth, as economIcrights hamper
development.
However, as authoritaranism, parcularly in Afrca, increasingly became
associated with economIc and institutional decay, the tide turned. Sincethe
mId-1980s, concern with the need for human rights, peaceful political
contestation and "good government" has prevailed. The links between
human rights, form of government and economIc development are,
however, far from established. The aim of this and the following chapter
is to review the academIc debate on these issues.
In this chapter we wiI star by considering the debate on the conflcting
nature of human rights. Two types of trade-offs between rights and
economIc development wiI then be discussed: The sacrificing of political
and civil rights in order to promote economIc development, and the trade-
off between development and economIc, social and cultural rights, that is,
when sections of the population are denied such rights as par of. a
development strategy.
Closely related to ths debate on human rights trade-offs, are questions
conceming the human rights performance of varous types of regimes.
These matters are on ly touched upon in this chapter; they wiI, however, be
discussed at length in Chapter 4.
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The contradictory nature of human rights
Tensions and contradictions between the varous types of rights constitutig
the Internauonal Bil of Human Rights are much debated in human rights
literature. The rights var in character and funcuon, and form the basis of
different types of claims.
The metaphor of "trmps" (Dworkin 1977) is often used to describe the
function of rights. In the same way that the trmp outranks other cards in
a card game,. human rights represent a claim that is not to be overrn by
other considerations - e.g. the consideration of economIc growth.
Problems arse when there are conflcting considerations, each of which can
claim the "right of way".
The discussion of how to balance human rights cIaims centre on the
following two questions: Do these conflcts actually exist? And which
rights should be given priority when a conflct does occur?
We wil star with a cIassification of human rights which reflects much
of the tension and contradictions discussed in the literatue, and thus wil
be useful for our fuer discussions. It identifies six categories of rights:
1) personal rights, which incIude protection agaist interference, tortre,
kidnapping and arbitrar imprisonment, etc. 2) Civil or liberal rights, such
as the right to free speech, free press, the right to assembly and
organisation. 3) Political rights, the right to parcipation, the right to vote
and the right to opposition. 4) Social and economic rights, the right to at
least a mInimum of vita necessities such as food, shelter and aid. 5)
Cultural or "national" rights, incIudig the right to express one's own
culture and language, the right to self-determnation, protection of
indigenous populations and their environment and the protection of
mInorities. 6) "Solidarity rights", the right to development, to a certain
social and physical environment, and the right to peace.
Negative versus positive rights
Conflcts are often seen to arse between "negative" and "positive" rights
- a long stading distinction withn poliucal philosophy which is given a
classical expression in Isaiah BerIin's essay "Two concepts of Libert"
(Berlin 1969). Negative rights are linked to the concept of negative liberty
(freedom from interference). These rights serve as a protection against
interference by others - primarly the state. Negative rights correspond to
the first two categories described above: personal and civil rights. Positive
rights are related to the concept of positive liberty (freedom to act).
Traditionally, in the philosophical debate, the primar positive right is the
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right to paricipate in political decision makng, but ths category incIudes
social and economIc rights as well. Conflcts between negative and positive
rights may arse in different ways. Positive rights to parcipation in the
political process may, for instace, cause decisions that are in conflct with
negative rights to protection against interference. Such conflcts have given
rise to debates on which rights are the more basic, and to be given priority
when conflcts occur.
Those who in recent years most vigorously have claimed the primacy of
negative rights - the right to non-interference - are libertarian scholars
such as Hayek (1948, 1967) and Nozick (1974). Libertaranism is an
extreme varant of the liberal tradition, which has generallyargued that
negative rights are to be given priority - as opposed to the democratic
tradition which stressesthe right to political parcipation.
The internal tension withn the Western liberal-democratic tradition,
between the liberal rights to non-interference and the democratic rights to
political parcipation, is obscured in the human rights debate. Personal,
civil and political rights are merged into one single category, cIassified as
negative rights. The idea is that negative rights are "those that do not cost
anythng". There is no shortge of these rights; there is no need to
withdraw rights from some people so that others may have them. Positive
rights are defined, in contrast, as rights demanding substantial transferences:
if the rights of some people are to be fulfilled, others must sacrifice their
rights.The fact that "positive" and "negative" rights are defined in different
ways withn the same debate is a cause of unnecessar obscurity - and the
division between "rights that cost and rights that do not cost" is disputable;
negative rights, according to this definition, imply social costs for police,
legal systems and electoral institutions. Still, this distinction is rather
important in that it forms the basis for influential trade-off arguments: In
some cases the granting of universal "negative" civil and political riglits
may be incompatible with the fulfiment of "positive" or "substantial"
social and economic rights. And fulfiment of positive individual rights to
food, medical care, shelter and education may require that negative rights
are encroached upon. Or in other words: there may be a trade-off between
civil and political rights and economIc growth.
This latter distinction between positive and negative rights is more or less
concurrent with the distinction often made between the "first and second
generation" of human rights. The first generation of human rights (personal,
civil and political rights) may be ascribed to the French philosophy of
Enlightenment and the French and American human rights declarations
from the late 1700s (see Chapter 2). These "Western" rights are not on ly
older than the other categories, they are also. of ten seen as the origin of
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social, economIc and cultural rights, termed the "second generation" of
human rights.24 The rights of the second generation are often referrd to
as the socialistic contrbution to international human rights, as the 
Labour
movement played a central par in the effort to promote these rights (as
did also a number of religious organsations).
This distinction between the first and second "generations" is parallelled
in the two human rights conventions adopted by the UN in 1966: the
international Convention on economIc, social and cultual rights and the
international Convention on civil and political rights (see Chapter 1).
A third generation of human rights has been added later: "solidarty
rights" - the right to a clean environment, the right to peace and the right
to development, as stated in the UN Declaration of 1986. These rights are
often considered to be. the Thd W orId countres' contrbution to the
international norm of human rights. Thd generation rights differ from the
first and sec ond generation in specifying the right to a proeess, rather than
a given standard of development, and they are to a large extent perceived
as the rights of states, in dose connection with the states' right to self-
determnation.
The thd generation of rights has been subject to much scepticism.
Questions are asked as to what these rights really imply, and how
"development" may be characterised as a right. Is "development" a period
of time ending with the realisation of universally accepted goods? Or is
"development" a synthesis of the conditions that may contrbute to the
realisation of such goods? Does the right to development imply the right to
the structural conditions necessar for the realisation of one' s social and
economIc rights?
Methodological problems of an explicit right to development are
addressed by PhiIIp Alston who arguesthat even though it is importt to
explicate the connection between human rights and the strctural factors
vital for their realisation, it may be unnecessar - it may even be
counterproductive - to formulate the strctual factors as rights (Cf. Alston
1982 and 1984).
The right to development is defined as the right (or duty) of a state,
giving rise to potential conflcts between individual human rights and the
right of the state (the group) to development - a right that opens up for
the use of individuals as means to promote collective development.
24 It has been pointed out that it may be unfonunate to use the term "generation" about
different nghts categones. as if "the older generaüons" were decrepid and outdated and
must give way to the younger.
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Question regarding the tension between individual and collective rights
occupy a central position in human rights literatue. Individual human rights
are the trmp card of the individual against the state; collective rights imply
that groups, or the state itself, are granted rights of equal force. The
inclusion of collective or group rights among human rights instrments has
been criticised. It is said to underme the significance of human rights as
protection against the state. According to critics, collective human rights is
even a contradiction in term; the concept "human rights" imply that they
belong to all men as individuals, by vire of their being human, while
collective rights, by necessity, is the rights of limIted groups of people,
such as ethic mInorities, indigenous populations or the population of a
paricular state.
While some hold that group-rights are in fact a kind of privilege, and
thus have nothng to do with human rights, others object that to grant
certain groups - such as indigenous populations, or the populations of
developing countres - special rights protection, may be necessar.in order
to secure their individual, universal human rights on a par with those of
other citizens. But even when there is a widely recognised need to protect
the vita interests of certain groups, it may be asked if these cIaims -
which per se are legitimate - should be given status as human rights?25
The discussions in ths section, of positive and negative rights, rights
generations and collective versus individual rights, point to tensions within
the human rights instrments. Some conflcts are "logical": it is a priori
possible to concIude that conflicts wil arse, that they are practically
inevitable: Without previous studies we may concIude that there are
situations where collective rights are bound to violate individualrights, that
quotas introduced to secure a mInority the right to non-discrimInation may
conflct with individual rights to non-discrimInation, and that the rights of
mInorities to self-determnation in some cases wil undermIne the rights of
the state to integrty and sovereignty.
Other conflcts are "empirical" in the sense that they are identified only
through research; they are possible, but not common. Whether the right to
political parcipation is incompatible with social and economIc rights,
belongs to the latter category which has to be established by research, and
in the following discussion of trade-offs between human rights respect and
economIc growth, we wil show the diffculty of determning which thesis
is the more plausible: the thesis that development and economic growth
15 An argument in favour of their inclusion in the International Bil of Human Rights, has
been that the se rights reflect a less individualistie view of society and thus contrbute to
the toning down of Western influence on human rights.
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require limIted civil and political rights or that development requires
cooperation and parcipation from below.
The human rights - economic growt trade-otT
The argument that developing countres, in their process of development,
must sacrifice civil and political rights (e.g. the right to a free press, to
assembly and elections), has figured promInently within development
economy and political science, especially in the sixties and seventies.
Varants of ths point of view is, however, maintaned up to the present
day.
The trade-off argument is based on cert premIses concerning the
interaction between politics and economIcs, the main thesis being that
economIc growth is incompatible with political paricipation. Political and
civil rights hamper development and should be suspended durng a period
of transition. In other words: Democracy is a bad solution if the objective
is to speed economIc development. This classical argument is aptly
iIustrated by the following quotation: "Every increase in freedom takes
place at the cost of a slow-down of development; everyacceleration of
development involves less freedom" (Løventhal 1963, .cted in Sørensen
1991: l).
Almond and Powell Iikewise maitan that economIc and institutional
development must precede democracy and welfare; without such a
preparatory phase, there wiI be nothing to share (Almond and Powell
1978). B. K. Nehr, advisor of the Indian government, expresses this idea
very clearly:
The only way to ensure economic growth is to increase capital
investment. ... Now, capital is merely the gap between current produetion
and current consumption. If, therefore, capital has to be generated from
within the countr the only immediate way of doing so is to increase the
gap by reducing consumption. ... If, therefore, the objective of government
is to remove poverty which is what the people desperately want, it must
necessarly tae measures such as increased taation which in the
immediate context, increase rather than decrease, the hardships of the
people, and therefore make the government unpopular, Therein Hes the
dilemma of democracy in a poor countr. Under a system in which
lawmakers ... seek the approval of the electorate, the politician cannot
afford ... to follow any policies which wil not produee tagible benefits
for the electorate by the time the next election comes around (Nehru
1979:570, cited in Sørensen.1991:8).
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Nehr's argument thatcivil and political rights hinder growth and
consequently, should not be given priority in a development process, was
an important par of the reasoning behid modernisation theories in the
1950s and 60s. A major argument was that new and underdeveloped states
had to choose a unilinear development strategy on . order to "catch up
with" the industralised states. EconomIc growth though industralisation
was the "prescribed" way to development. The aim of development was to
become a "mass-consumIng society", in other words - the Western
ideai.26 However, the modernisation theoristsdid not conceive the trade-
offbetween paricipatory rights and economIc growth as being problematie.
According to the m, democracy and paricipation rights would succeed
economIc development.
Towards the end of the 1960s, a new school emerged withn development
theory, emphasising the role and strctue of state agencies. Samuel P.
Huntington, in his book PoliticalOrder in Changing Societies (1968),
criticised the assumption of modernisation theorists that processes of
modernisation and development were mutually reinforcing. According to
Huntington, the transformation processes in the developing countres would
lead to either chaos or political stabilty. The decisive factor was the state
building and -development, which would have to precede popular
paricipation (Huntington 1968).
The hypothesis that poIiticaIly repressive regimes have a greater potential
for development than democratic regimes, hasbeen founded on a number
of arguments. A widely hel d view - apparently supported by the economIc
performance of Latin American "bureaucratic-authoritaan" regimes in the
1960s, and the high growth rates of certn East Asian countres - is that
a "strong" or "autonomous" state is needed at a certn stage if rapid
economIc development and industralisation is to take place(cf. O'DonneIl
1978, Cardoso & Falletto 1979, Lee & Lee 1992, Amsden 1985, Haggard
1991). EconomIc development requires a strct rule, and civil and political
rights limIt the autonomy of the state. This argument is usually based on
one or several of the following assumptions: Firstly, it is often assumed that
democratic govemments manipulate the economy to generate political
support in elections Cpolitical business cycIe'), and moreover, that
26 The stage of mass-consumption is the fifth and last stage in Rostow's stage-theory on
economic development. He assumed that all countres, whatever staing positions, would
experience the same proeess of deve10pment culminating in the final goal, which was
largely a model of the American welfare society (Rostow 1962). Fora more
comprehensive discussion of the trade-off argument and modemisation, see Apter (i 965);
Huntington (1968); LaPalombara (1963); Lipset (1959).
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democratic regimes encourage trade unions, and that trade unions often
behave iresponsibly by demanding increased wages, thus hampering
growth. Both of these assumptions imply that a lid must be kept on popular
demand-makng. A thdargument is that political parcipation creates
political instability, thus discouraging foreign investment.
Extensive empircal research support these arguments. Robert Marsh
studied 98 countres during the period 1955-1970 and conc1udes that
democracy hinders economIc growth, whereas repressive regimes stimulate
economIc growth (March 1979:244). A study of economIc growth in a
number of Latin American countres has come to a simIlar conclusion
(Cohen 1985:123).
The trade-off argument has, however, been contested - both on
empircal and normative grounds. Willam G. Dicks found, in his empircal
study of 72 countres in the period 1959-68, that - contrar to the studies
referred to above - authoritaan regimes are not necessarly more
effective in promoting economIc growt than democratic regimes (Dick
1974:823). The argument that authoritaan regimes are stable regimes has
also been rejected. One-par states and mIlita dictatorships have on
average a much shorter life expectacy than democratic regimes (Goodin
1979:4). Moreover, the argument of the "political business cyc1e" has been
rej~cted on the grounds that it does not explain the stabilty of authoritaan
regimes. Several studies have shown that authoritaran regimes also
manipulate the economy in order to secure popular support (Goodin 1979).
Contrar to analyses of the development potential of some authoritaian
states in Asia and (until the 1980s) in Latin America, most studies of
African countres conc1ude that authoritaanism has had adverse
consequences for economIc development (cf. Ake 1991, Nyong'o 1992).27
Not only do these analyses conclude that in Afrca the "trade-off argument"
is not substatiated, that authoritaianism, as a rule, is associated with
economIc stagnation and decline. It is also argued that theories of a
democracy-development trade-off have had an unintended effect - the
argument that repression promotes economIc growth and development has
been used by political leaders to legitimIse their own free spending of state
resources (Howard 1983).
These contradictory conc1usions are parly due to the way concepts and
categories are defined. One central problem is the definition of democracy
as opposed to authoritaan regimes. Both the definitions themselves and the
subsequent classifications are vital for the results of the analysis. After
...
17 Berg-Schlosser' s study of African regimes concludes. however, that authoritaan regimes
prornote growth in GNP (Berg-Schlosser 1985:143).
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having "tested" the hypothesis that certai regime types promote
development, on the basis of four case studies (Costa Rica, Taiwan, India
and China), Georg Sørensen (1991) has concIuded that the categories
"authoritaan" and "democratic" must be fuer differentiated before valid
conclusions about theIr development potential can be made (Sørensen
1991:188). SimIlarly, Haggard and Kaufman (1989) found thatmore
refined categories than those of "authoritaanism" and "democracy" were
needed in order to differentiate between regimes and their abilty to
promote economIc development.
Sub-division into categories is not the only procedure that poses
problems, the distrbution of countres into categories is also diffcult. Dick
(1974) makes useof the following thee regime categories: Authoritaran
regimes, regimes pary characterised by political competition and regimes
characterised by political competition. He concludes that regimes parly
characterised by political competition are the most effective in promoting
economIc growth. However, according to his definition, African countres
such as Algeria, Ethopia, South Afrca and even Nicaragua under Somoza,
are considered to be parly characterised by political competition -
countries that would elsewhere be considered authoritaan.28 In the next
chapter the differentiation of regime types wil be discussed at some length.
Another importt problem in relation to the studies of human rights and
development is the definition of the concept of economIc growth. In 1979,
the UN agreed that the main goal of development is the realisation of
human potential, in harony with society. Moreover, The International
Commssion of Jurists has defined development as the right. of all people
and all citizens all over the world to enjoy all the human rights included in
the International Bil of Human Rights (Alston 1981: 101). These definitions
ilustrate the problems of introducing non-economIc indicators as criteria of
development, and the IimItations of the narow definitions of economIc
growth used in the empircal investigations.
The investigations referred to above equate, to a great extent,
development and growth in GNP. Today there appears to be a growing
realisation that at least two aspects must be incIuded in the. concept of
"development": EconomIc growth, and welI-being. It is more difficult to
find adequate indicators of welI-being, which concems the satisfaction of
basic needs such as the needfor food, medicalcare, shelter and education
(often summed up as "redistrbution"). When the redistrbution aspect is
28 The time aspect is another problemauc element in Dick's analysis. Is the short period
from 1958 to 1968 areasonable period of time for such an analysis? How long should
such a period be. before valid statements can be made?
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included as an indicator of development, different conclusions are drawn.
Hewlett, basing her argument mainly on Latin American conditions, finds
a positive correlation between political repression and. growth and a
negative correlation between repression and "development" - when
redistrbution is taen into consideration (Hewlett 1979:471). One of her
main arguments is that there are no incentives for redistrbution in the Latin
American capitaistic development strategy, thus excluding the majority of
the population fromparcipation and economIc growth (Cf. also Diaz-
Alejandro 1981, and Kaufman 1985).
So far we have seen that the "necessity" of trade-offs depends on the
definition of development as well as on the definition and classification of
regimes. We have also seen that attempts to test the empircal connec,tion
between regime type and economIc growth, do not prov ide dear answers.
Human rights analysts have argued that growt (in GNP) is a spurious goal
of economIc development, as a just distrbution of resources is not included
(Howard 1987). The problem is that when the definition of development is
extended to indude non-economIc objectives, it is hard to find universal
measurable criteria of development.
Equality - growth trade-offs
The question of whether a defInition of economIc development should
include redistrbution,leads us to another major problem: The assumed
tension between equality and growt. Is there a trade-off between social
justice and growth? Is economic development hampered by universal rights
to abetter stadard of living? Jf this is so, should economIc resourcesbe
concentrated on certin groups, maximising the potential for further
(economIc) growth? (Donelly 1984)
Within economic development research it has been arguedthat in
industralised countres equality and growth are conflcting considerations
as growt requires capital accumulation and investment, promoted by
savings (Cf. Boulding 1968, and Johnson 1962). EconomIc inequalities
promote growth in GNP, and according to this argument inequality is not
only an unfortnate trnsitional phenomenon, but a necessar precondition
of development. The profit is accumulated in high income groups with the
greatest saving potentiaI. Savings wil benefit the poor in the form of new
investments etc. - of ten referred to as the "trckIe-down" effect of
development.
The argument that growth and development require or are promoted by,
unequal distrbution, has led to reactions and counter-arguments by
economists as well as human rights scholars. Empirically, it has been
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pointed out that the assumption that the upper classes are inclined to save
money ignores the propensity of high-income groups to spend their money
on luxur rather than on savings and investments. Other empircal research
has shown that there is no clear evidence that savings are placed withn the
borders of one's own countr. The capita flght from Latin American and
Afrcan countres show that inequality does not necessarly result in
increased domestic investments. Jack Donnelly, in his comparative analysis
of Brazil and South Korea, argues that inequality is not a precondition for
economIc growth and development; while growth rates of both countres
have been high (higher in South Korea), the growth in South Korea -
unlike in Brazil - has been coupled with redistrbution (Donelly 1987).
Implicit in the trade-off argumentation is the assumption that the decision
to ignore or down-play certain rights is temporar and that the conditions
are seIf-correctig. Critics argue that there is Iittle evidence to support the se
assumptions. Prvileged groups are not parcularly willng to give up
acquired economIc goods. Quite to the contrar, inequalities as par of a
development strategy tend to create class differences that in the long term
counteract redistrbution. Growth first could lead to redistrbution
afterwards; but ths theory ignores the extremely strong resistance to post
facto income distrbution (Donnelly 1987:276, Howard 1983).
In addition to the empirically based objections to human rights trade-off
as par of development strategies, a series of moral and ethical objections
havebeen raised against both equality and libert trade-offs. Is it ethically
justifiable to sacrifice a whole generation for the sake of uncertain benefits
sometime in the future? Objections of a more social kind point out the fatal
consequences of short term trade-offs in poor pars of the worId (Streeten
1980).
To sum up the discussions of "trade-offs" between human rights and
economIc development: The central issues are whether the downgrading of
some human rights, political or economIc, wil promote economIc growth,
and whether such strategi es may be justified.
Despite theamount of quantitative research cared out and some decades
of historicalexperience, the' connections between economIc development,
human rights respect and political systems are stil unclear. The findings of
varous analyses seem to depend precarously on definitions, classifications
and the time aspect. The conflcting evidence of authoritaan regimes'
economIc performance, has lead to a new focus in current research on the
role of state-society interactions in development, in order to map diversities
andrelate them to variations in economIc policies (cf. Skålnes 1993,
Raker 1992, Bratton 1992 and Hydèn and Bratton 1992).
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Jack Donnelly underIines the moral dilemma of the trade-off arguments
when pointing out that human rights trade-offs are normative and aresult
of political choices. In a development process, there wil always be a need
to balance certn conflcung Interests; but even so, the degree of human
rights violation wil depend on the choice of development strategy, Neither
economIc nor political trade-offs can be justified as political necessities. At
issue here are political choices based on different political development
models and strategies. Prorities are not absolutely necessar, and are
therefore subject to moral assessment (Donnelly 1987).
Ths leads us to the discussion of the relation between human rights and
polities, and specifica1y to the connection between regime types and
violations of human rights.
Withn political science, the relationship. between human rights and
regime types has been cIosely 1inked to the question of democracy and
democratisauon, and the preconditions of democracy. In Chapter four we
wiI discuss some of the central issues of ths debate, and consider the
limItationS of democracy in relation to human rights.
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4. Human rights and regime types
Does respect for human rights require a certn kind of political
organisation, or more specifically - does it require democracy? The
relationship between regime type and human rights is important for the
debate on development strategi es and human rights.
The state has the power that may be used to prevent - or to execute -
human rights violations, and the power to guarantee human rights
observance. The state, or the political leaders, select economIc and political
strategies which in turn wil influence the human rights situation, both in
the short- and long-term. Recent studies have considered human rights from
a state and regime perspective. Common to these studies is the assumption
that the way in which power is legitimated and organised, and the
relationship between rulers and citizens, account for major differences in
regimes' human rights policy. Ths is also the point of deparre in this
chapter. By regime type is to be understood the set of rules, conventions
and norms ruling the govemmental process (Kimber, 1989:201).
We wil discuss the relationship between regime types and human rights,
based on thee analyses with differing regime classifications and human
rights definitions. The aim of such typologies is to predict rights violations
that are motivated politically, by something internal to the logic of that
parcular type of regime (Goodin, 1992:223). Against ths background, we
wil discuss the limits of democracy in relation to human rights protection
and moreover, whether all communities can develop democratic institutions.
This discussion wil draw on the (growing amount of) literature on
conditions for, and transition to, democracy.
Regime types and human rights violations
When studying the relationship between type of regime and, human rights
protection, the definition and operationalisation of the central concepts are
cruciaI. ConcIusions rely precariously on how regimes are classified and in
terms of how human rights are measured.
Robert A. Dahl considers the degree of rights protection under different
regimes, based on a limIted set of political rights and liberties (Dahl 1992).
170 independent states are cIassified on the basis of four criteria: free and
fair elections, freedom of expression, freedom of political organisation, and
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availabilty of alternative sources of information.29 41 countres are
classified as democratic according to all four criteria. half of which (22) are
characterised as 'mature ' democracies. These are mainly European or
English-speakng countres.
Dahl concIudes that the most comprehensive systems of political rights
and libertes in the contemporar world exist in democratic countries.
Subsequently, although democratic countres var in their protection of
political (not to mention other) rights, to press for democratisation is the
best strategy for increased protection of human rights in non-democratic
countries. Based on this, he goes on to discuss which preconditions are
necessar for non-democratic countres to develop democratic institutions,
a question to which we wil retu later in ths chapter.
This typology cIearly ilustrates how certn human rights are among the
defining characteristics of certn types of political regimes. Extensive
political rights and libertes are, as Dah himself notes, integral to
democracy; "they are integral to the institutions that distinguish modern
democracy from other kids of political orders" (Dahl 1992:235).
Dahl' sanalysis may be criticised on two accounts. Firt, considering
human rights only in the Iimited sense of political rights and liberties, is
problematic both ideologically and in the sense of risking tautological
concIusions.30 Secondly, Dah cIassifies regimes according to a uni-
dimensional democratic (or polyarchal)-authoritaan distinction. Although
his scale, ranging from most polyarchal to least polyarchal (omItting the
USSR and Eastem Europe as special cases), goes beyond a simple
democratic-nondemocratic dichotomy, it reveals limIted information about
the political forces intern al to parcular forms of regimes that influence
their human rights performance and . developmental potential. Furer
distinctions are necessar in order to bring out characteristics of regimes
relevant to their human rights performance.
Juan J. Linz tres to come to term with these problems. The
operationalisation problems are discussed explicitly.But although he
concIudes that analyses should be based on the International Bil of Human
Rights - a universal set of stadards that all civilised states should
29 Each of these criteria is then divided into thee categories. For example: 1). Elections
without significance or routine fraud or coercion, 2) Elections with some fraud or
coercion. 3) No meaningful elections (Dahl 1992:237). Dahls analysis is based on a
study by Coppedge & Reinecke (1988).
30 When human rights are defined as civil and political rights, operationalised as multi-
pany systems characterised by regular elections with broad popular paricipation, there
is obviously a dose connection between human rights respect and democratie regimes.
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recognise, his own analysis considers mainly civil and political rights. Linz
cIassifies political systems into four categories: sultanistie, totalitarian,
authoritarian and democratie (Linz, 1992). The political system least
compatible with the idea of human rights, is the sultanistie regime, defined
as. a regime of personal rulership with a political strctue based on the
loyalty and interests of followers, famly frends or trbes. Govemmental
actions of such personalised regimes are not under the control of any
institutional norms or commonly accepted principles, but a result of the
arbitrar wil of the ruler. Sultastic regimes are political systems without
any predictable rule of law, and the limIted capacity and knowledge of the
ruler is the on ly barer against the violation of rights.
Totalitarian regimes are political systems built on a holistic ideology that
also comprises the private sphere, where political parcipation is either
forced or highly rewarded. According to Linz' definition, only Hitler' s
Germany and Stain's Soviet Union may be defined as totalitaran regimes.
both regimes being characterised by political terror and arbitrar use of
politicallyorgansed violence against groups and individuals.
Authoritarian regimes are placed somewhere between sultanistic and
totalitaran regimes; they do not pursue the utopian goals of totalitaranism,
nor can they be characterised by the privatisation of the state apparatus
typical of sultanistic regimes. Linz defines authoritaan regimes as political
systems with limted, not responsible political pluralism. Authoritaan
regimes are not accountable to the citizens, but as opposed to totalitaan
regimes there is no guiding ideology, only "distinctive mentalities" and
there is no extensive political mobilsation. The main difference between
totalitaran and authoritaan regimes is, according to Linz, that in
authoritaran regimes the private sphere of most people remain
uncontrolled. Free exercise of religion is thus in many cases tolerated. Stil,
the main libert granted by authoritaan regimes is the right to be
politically indifferent.
Democracy is by Linz characterised as a political system guaranteeing the
right to expression, information and organisation for the purpose of a free
competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals, by non-violent
means, the cIaim to rule. Ths definition of democracy implies that regimes
cIaimIng to be democratic, have to respect a wide range of human rights.
Unlike Dahl, Linz differentiates between varous types of non-democratic
regimes. His typology yields more in terms of explaining the relationship
between human rights and types of political regimes, but, as Linz himself
points out, the distinction between forms of regimes fall far short of
explaining or predicting the existing varations in human rights
performance.
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While distinguishing between forms of authoritaan regimes,
differentiating their capacity for human rights protection, Linz leaves the
"democracy" category untouched as the favoured form of regime. This is
paricularly dissatisfactory in light of his concIusion that democracy, despite
being the form of government providing the best guarantees against human
rights violations, do not protect all human rights at all times and under all
conditions: Democracy offers only to a small extent protection of social and
economIcrights, and the rights of mInorities are often theatened in
democratic regimes.
Rhoda Howard and Jack Donnelly (1986) approach the question of
human rights protection and regime types from a somewhat different
perspective, avoiding the "democracy" category. Contrar to both Linz' and
Dahl' s analyses, the Donnelly/Howard analysis is based on a definition of
human rights expIicitly incIuding all categories of rights included in the
International Bil of Human Rights. Existing regimes are not classified on
the basis of ths human rights stadard; rather it is an assessment of the
human rightscapacities of regime tyes in their pure or ideal form.
Donnelly and Howard. distinguish, first of all, between communitarian
and individualistic regimes. Individualistic regimes are sub-divided into
liberal and minimal regimes, while communitaran regimes are divided into
four sub-groups: communist, corporatist, traditional and developmental.
The degree of permssible inequality is the basic difference within the
category of individualistic regimes. Liberal regimes have as their central
value that the state should treat each individual as morally and politically
equal. "Inequality is not objectionable to the liberal, but the principle of
equal concem and respect does imply a floor of basic economIc welfare,
degrading inequalities cannot be permtted" (Donnelly & Howard,
1986:805). The minimal state emphasises liberty and down-play the concern
for equality. The state is only required to protect the individual against
violations of personallibertes. Minimal regimes, according to Donnelly and
'Howard, allow degrading inequalities, and are thus not in accordance with
the requirements for human-rights respect.
Communitarian regimes give priority to the community, both
ideologically and in practice. This often implies priority of the state over
the individual. IndividuaIs are entitled to respect only as members of the
group or society, in accordance with the duties and roles ascribed to them.
According to Donnelly and Howard, all forms of communitaran regimes
are incompatible with the idea of human rights because they preclude
individual autonomy.
In communist regimes the collectively defined goal of bu ilding a society
based on a paricular idea of the good, conflct with the civil and political
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rights of individuals. SimIlarly, corporatist regimes, strctured around
interest-group representation, and divided into non-competitive hierarchical
strctures, violate basic political rights by not permttng politIcal conflcts
(such as labour conflicts). Traditional societies - societies based on a
haronious, organIc conception of unity between individual and society.-
are also incompatible with respect for human rights, as defined by Donnelly
and Howard, the reason bein g that individual goods only can be attained to
the extent that the individual is a par of a larger collective - the famly
or the trbe. Developmental regimes govern by force, justifying repression
as a necessar element in a strategy for economIc development. Individual
rights, in parcular vis-a-vis the state, are set aside, thus violating the
concern for basic human rights.
According to ths classification only liberal democracies providing a
certn level of material well-being to their citizens protect human rights
adequately:
Other social systems may claim to have competing views on human
rights. They do not. Rather they rest on competing views of human
dignity, all of which deny both the centrality of the individual in political
society and the human rights of men and women to make, and have
enforced, equal and inalienable civil, political, economic and social claim
on the state. Only liberalism, understood as a regime based on the
political right to equal concern and respect, is a political system based on
human rights (Donnelly & Howard 1986:816).
These thee studies of the relationship between regime type and human
rights define human rights in different ways and use different regime
classifications. The first is a quantitative empirical analysis of 170 countres
(Dahl 1992), the second applies a historical-comparative method (Linz
1992), whìIe the third study is purely theoretical (Donnelly & Howard
1986). Stil, their concIusions arealmost identical. All find that human
rights receive the best protection within the framework of a democratic
regime, and that democracy is a necessar condition for an adequate human
rights protection. However, the Donnelly/Howard analysis stads out on a
crucial matter; it stresses that only certn types of democratic regimes
observebasic rights: Both mInimal and liberal regimes may be
democracies, but only liberal regimes are consistent in their human rights
protection. Guarantees for political rights and liberties are not suffcient. In
order to respect human rights, regimes must also take steps to prevent
degrading inequalities. Only liberal democracies guaranteeing a certin
mInimum of welfare qualify for ths ideal type.
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Both Linz and Dahl use a "mInimal definition" of political democracy:
a political system that guarantees freedom of expression and political
organisation, access to alternative sources of information and free
elections.31 When this is combined with the operationalisation of human
rights as central political rights and libertes, the conclusion that democracy
is the political system offering the best protection of human rights, is rather
obvious. There is thus a danger of tautology posed by the analytic links
between definitions of regime types and parcular categories of human
rights.
Donnelly and Howard escape ths problem byincorporating a wider
range of rights. Their problem is that variations of human rights violations
are not considered, e.g. what types of rights violations are due to capacity
problems, and which are to be seen as a result of the internal logic of the
regime form. Wide definitions of the concept of human rights that include
social and economIc rights, often cause respect for human rights to be made
identical with a "good society". Failing to meet the requirements wiI then
no longer be classified as human rights violations, but as lack of capacity.
Does democracy spell human rights respect?
While there is often disagreement on whether capitaism is good or bad,
and on the. virtes of socialism, or communism, there seems to be
universal consensus that democracy is good and dictatorship bad. ...
Democracy, however understood, universally connotates a positive value,
something to aspire to or at least to identify with. (Diamond, Linz &
Lipset 1990:449)
Politically it seems as if the debate concerning which regime types are best
suited to protect or promote human rights, is becomIng obsolete. In the
absence of strong ideological differences between East and West32 the
superiority of political democracy enjoys universal accIaim. As aresult,
human rights are increasingly being reduced to an issue of multipary
elections.
3 i This definition of political democracy is originally made by Schumpeter (Schumpeter
1950:269).
32 South appear to have lost its vote. As noted in Chapter 2. there is continuing resistanee
among third world regimes, in parcular in Asia and the Islamc world. against the
current trend of "universalising" and enforcing the Western interpretation of human
rights.
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The analyses presented above support the conclusion that democratic
regimes generallyare the more conducive to human rights respect,
compared to more authoritaan types of regimes. Processes of
democratisation generally represent a positive development from the point
of view of human rights. Democratic institutions allows for upward control
of the political leadership and function as information channels between the
rulers and the ruled. thus fuerig flexibilty and political change within
the existing system.
But the above discussions also indicate that all human rights are not
necessarly protected in democratic regimes, and that all types of
democratic regimes do not protect human rights equally well. Democratic
regimes primarly protect civil and political rights; the guarantee for social
and economIc rights is not found in the democratic process per se.
However, political and civil rights (democracy) are often seen to be a
precondition for guarantees of economic and social securty, by. allowing
political strggles whereby individual rights to welfare may emerge.
A number of scholars concemed with societies deeply divided by ethnìc
cleavages, have argued that under such circumstances democracy may
amount to majoritaan dictatorship and wiI not offer suffcient protection
for the rights of mInorities. Considerable scholarly energy is devoted to
finding forms of democratic regimes with better ability to protect the
fundamenta rights of mInority populations (Lijphar, 1979, 1985; Horowitz
1986, 1990. Cf. also Eriksen 1991 and Gloppen 1993). Unless the rights of
mInorities are protected institutionally, though constitutional provisions or
power-sharng arangements, the interests of the majority are pron e to
undermne the legitimate cIaims of mInorities. In situations where the
majority demands total ai;simIlation of mInority groups (or even worse;
"ethnic cleansing"), systematic human rights violations are Iikely to occur,
also in democratic regimes (Cf. SchmIdt, 1989).
Democracy as a form of government also faces charges conceming
protection of the so called solidarty, or thrd generation rights. These
include the collective right to development, peace and a cIean environment.
It has been argued that in political democracies the State lacks suffcient
autonomy to pursue such long term collective goals. The regime depends
on the support of a majority (each voting to maximIse their individual self-
interest) and are thus forced to be responsive to current demands in a
manner which runs counter to long term collective interests. Some
authoritaran regimes commtted towards development seem to have
performed better than democratic regimes under simIlar conditions. This has
been ascribed to the relative autonomy of the state (Nelson 1990). In a
simIlar fashion it is sometimes argued that protection of the environment
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may be more successfully cared out by a non-democratic regime
commtted to this goal. However, there ar a number of authoritaan
regimes performng catastrophically - and far worse than most democratic
regimes in terms of development. Furermore, the situation e.g. in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union demonstrates - and vividly so - that
non-democratic regimes by no means are paricularly inclined to protect the
environment!
Stil - although the alternatives seem to be worse - democracy in and
by itself cannot adequately protect these thd generation rights. On the
other hand democracies, despite their weakesses, appear to provide the
best basis for human rights observance. To the majority of the people on
this planet, the problem is not that all form of human rights are not fully
protected by democratic regimes; their problem is rather that the
governments and political systems under which they live guarantee neither
personal security or political rights nor the most fundamental economIc
rights.
Analysing human rights from. a regime perspective yields some
interesting insights. But most of ths research is toa general. It cannot
explain why a "quasi-democratic" regime such as Guatemala, with a
democratic constitution, has managed to paralyse its people by the use of
death squadrons, aritrar terror and massacres. Or why, in countries such
as South Korea, extensive redistrbution, economIc development and land
reforms have been cared out within the framework of a non-democratic
regime. None of the thee analyses referred to above, manage to captue
these varations in human rights observance in their differentiation of
regime types. In order to explain the differences, factorssuch as stability,
legitimacy and economIc effciency are introduced.
Regime stability, legitimacy and etlciency
Linz concIudes that the degree of stabilty is probably more importt for
human rights respect than type of regime (Linz 1992). All regimes that are
stable (except some totaitaan ones) are less Iikely to violate human rights.
Systematic violations also occur in democracies, when the political situation
is unstable or the integrty of the state power is theatened, e.g. by
extremIst ideologies questioning the legitimacy of the democratic order. In
the post-war period in Europe there are a number of cases of violations of
civil and political human rights in unstable democracies, and in democratic
regimes under conditions of stress. At present Great Britain may serve as
an example of a stable democratic regime IimIting certn civil and poliical
(democratic) rights in response to a situation where it faces violent political
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means, such as terrorism: The British government has restrcted the right
to a free press in matters concerning the Nortern Ireland conflct (Kimber
1989:218).
The degree of stabilty seems to be an extremely importt factor for
human rights observance, both for democratic and non-democratic regimes.
The concept of stabilty is, however, problematic. Parcularly violent and
repressive regimes may att a high degree of stabilty if their population
is passive, in fear of state reprisaIs. Jf the human rights situation of a
regime is only assessed on the basis of concrete violations, violent but
stable regimes, such as Iran (1968-90) and Moi's Kenya (for most of the
1980s) wiI not appear to be repressive.
Perhaps even more importt than stabilty when existing varations in
human rights respect are to be explained, is the related issue of regime
legitimacy. When a regime is weaky founded, basing its existence on
violence, serious human rights violations wiI practically be a necessity.
Repression of the majority is also to be expected when governments are
based on support from a small sector of society; for instace in multi-ethic
societies, where the state is controlled by one ethc group or a coalition
of ethnic groups. When multi-cultual states contan strong ethnic conflcts
threatening the integrty of the regime, human rights are often violated.
Perhaps as importt as the type of regime is the success in state- and
preferably nation building, or the more diffcult task of creating multi-
national, multi-ethic, plural societies. Without achieving that goal even
democracies are likely to violate human rights. (Linz 1992:221)
To a certain extent it seems possible for regimes to compensate for lack of
legitimacy though effciency, that is, the abilty of a regime to deliver, both
politically and economIcaIly, seems to be decisive. Hannan and Caroll
(1981) found that high levels of economIc development tended to promote
stability - not only of democratic forms of regimes.33 SimIlarly,
Diamond, Lipset and Linz in their four volume study of democracy in
developing countres found that "regimes that lack deep legitimacy depend
more precarously on current performance and are vulnerable to collapse in
periods of economIc and social distress" (Diamond et al, 1990: 10).
We have seen that studies based on general regime typologies, resort to
explanations not related to the type of regime as such in order to account
33 In light of the recent changes in the previous Eastem Block countres, as well as in the
newly industralising countres . such as South Korea and Taiwan, a similar study
conducted today would, however, probably come up with rather different findings.
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for vanations in the respect for human rights. Ths indicates that the
relationship between human rights and political system is cIosely linked to
the strctual conditions of each individual countr. To analyse the potential
for human rights respect of varous tyes of regimes, independent of their
actual social, historical and economIc context, thus yield limIted insights.
An alternative approach is to furter differentiate democratic regime forms
into sub-categories, analysing their potential for protecting different human
rights in paricular empircal contexts (Gloppen 1993).
The awareness of the fact that the character of civil society and of state-
society relations is importt for regimes' human rights records, have also
resulted in concrete studies of how civil society is strctued andorganized,
how state institutions incIude or exclude societa forces in the policy-
makng process, how pressures arse and assert themselves, or alternatively
are contaned or suppressed under varous conditions (Raker 1992). These
add to our understanding of the relationship between human rights
protection and political form.
A substatial amountof curent acadeßUc research focuses on the
conditions under which democracy may be developed and sustained. Yet
other studies of increasing political relevance approach the question of what
happens to the human rights situation in the democratisation process itself,
that is, during the period of transition from authoritaan forms of rule
(Andreassen 1993).
Studies of democracy in developing countres, and the conditions for
emergenceof democratic institutions,. are central to the question of human
rights respect and political form. The possibilty of democracy developing
in different societies has become a very importt field of research in a
situation where the desirabilty of democracy is generally accepted. Thus
conditions for democracy is our focus in the following sections.
. Conditions for democracy and respect for human rights
Although political democracy do not automatically guarantee human rights
respect, it is often viewed as a precondition. Human rights are among the
defining characteristics of democracy; the International Bil of Human
Rights regards democratic rights as universal principles that all states have
a duty to recognise. But is it possible for all countres to develop
democratic institutions?
There is anextensive literature on the preconditions for democratisation.
It may roughly be divided into two schools: One focusing on cultural
preconditions, the other on socio-econoinc and strctural conditions. The
latter category of analysis, based on aggregated data and multi-national
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analyses, concludes more or less unanimously that level of economIc
development appears to be the domInant explanatory varable in
determning political democracy (Bollen & Jackman, 1985:42).34
Most of the studies simply divide regimes into democracies and non-
democracies, at most incIuding semI-democracies. Diamond (1991)
proposes a more sophisticated typology of seven regime types,
differentiating between the dimensions of democracy - competition,
paricipation and liberty. Using Freedom House's annual survey of political
rights, he divides countres into the following types: 1) State hegemonic,
closed; 2) State hegemonic, parially open; 3) Non-competitive, parially
pluralist; 4) SemI-competitive, parally pluralist; 5) Competitive, parially
iliberal; 6) Competitive, pluralist, parally institutionalised; and 6) Liberal
democracy.
Diamond fin ds a strong relationship betweeneconomIc development and
democracy when cross-tabulating these regime types with per capita gross
national product (GNP, 1989) for 142 countries (Diamond 1991, 1992).
GNP or per capita national income are the varables most commonly used
to indicate development. This is widely criticised, however, because these
varables say nothng about the distrbution of welfare.
When substituting GNP for the Human Development Index (HDI),35
Diamond finds an even stronger relationship between democracy and
development, and a more perfect step pattern of association with regime
democraticness for different levels of development (Diamond 1992: 100). A
countr's mean level of "human development" or physical quality of life,
is thus a better predictor of democracy and level of political freedom than
is the absolute level of income.
The relationship between democracy and level of development have been
furter strengthened by the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern
Europe. The ideological change resulting in a near-universalization of
popular demands for political freedom, representation, paricipation and
accountabiIty, have removed a non-developmental barer to democracy
(Diamond 1992: 102). Merely to demonstrate a covarance between level of
development and democracy does, however, not establish causality. From
34 A number of quantitative studies have examined the relationship between democracy and
different dimensions of socio-economic development, almost all of which have found a
positive relationship. (Lipset 1959, Coleman 1960; Cutrght 1963; Russett 1965; Olsen
1968; Dahl 1971; Coulter 1975; Powe1l1982; cf. Diamond 1992).
35 Ameasure developed by the United Nations Development Programre (UNDP),
combining a measure for per capita GNP, with nonmonetary measures of human wt:lfare
such asliteracy and life expectancy.
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the late 19605, to study change, and establish causality, has been the
concern of a number of scholars. (Bollen and Jackman, 1985, Bollen, 1979,
1883, Lipset, Seong and Torres 1991. Cf. Diamond 1992: 104) They
concIude more or less unanimously that the leveI of economIc development
is "the single most importt predictor of political democracy when
controllng for other varables" (Lipset et al. 1991:21). The quantitative
evidence collected durng thee decades of research support the conclusion
that the more well-to-do the people of a countr, on average, the more
likely they wil favour, achieve, and maintan a democratic system
(Diamond 1992: 109).
But even though the research indicates a higher probabilty for
democracy to be established in rich than in poor countres, ths does not
prove that democracy is impossible in poor countres: "The evidence simply
does not sustain the hypothesis that a high level of socio-economIc
development is either a necessar or a suffcient condition for competitive
politics" (Dahl 1971:71).
The school of theories focusing on cultural preconditions for a
democratic development do not necessarly - or usually - deny relevance
of economIc development. They argue, however, that economIc
development produces or faciltates democracy only insofar as it alters
favourably crucIal intervening varables such as political cultue, cIass
strctures, state-society relations and cIviI society (Diamond 1992:127). In
addition they hold that where cultural conditions are favourable, democracy
may be developed and sustaned even where the level of economIc
development is unfavourable, such as in India and Costa Rica.
Within this school some theories have argued that only when a society
has moved from the traditional towards the modern society, democratic
institutions may develop (Lerner 1959:49-50). Others have pointed out
personal explanatory factors and the significance of political leaders for the
development of democracy (Lipset 1960; Lijphar 1977). Yet others have
stressed the importance of a political culture in which thereis a general
consensus about governmenta procedures (Almond & Verba 1965:11-30).
The lattr strand of thnking is re-vitaised in a curently very influential
school of thought emphasising the importce of a vigourous associational
life or civil society for democracy (Shah 1988, O'Donnell and SchmItter
1986. Schlemmer 1991, ,Raker 1992, Tørrs, fortcomIng). It is argued
that, at least when they are democratic in their internal procedures of
governance, volunta associations socialise their members into democratic
values and beliefs and help to recruit and train new political leaders, and
thus facilitate formal democratic politics (Diamond 1992:125).
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A recent and noticeable work by Robert Putnam (1993) concIudes that
"civicness" is what matters. Based on a study of regional government in
Italy over 20 years it is concIuded - afer dismIssing initially plausible
explanations such as level of economIc development, levels of social and
political strfe, educational attnment, urbansm, and the role of the
communist par - that regional government works best in regions with
high levels of "civic community". That is, pattems of social co-operation
based on tolerance, trst and widespread norms of active citizen
paricipation. Disturbingly, for the prospects of democracy in developing
countres, he fin ds that the distrbution of civic community among the
regions in present day Italy was aleady cIearly evident as long ago as the
13th century.
Putnam's thesis is that economIc development does not explain political
development. Rather, long-established pattems of civic community explain
both a region's capacity for economIc growt and its capacity for
democratic self-government. This is unsettng for the prospects of
democracy in most countres in Asia, Afrca, Latin America as well as in
Eastern Europe. It suggests that political leaders in uncivic regions and
countres lack the fundamenta building-blocks from which a stable
democracy can be buiIt, and - at least implicitly - that civicness is
almost impossible to create where it does not already exist; that social
capital is far harder to accumulate than physical capital; andthat patron-
client relations with their cycles of dependence and norms of favour-
seeking are almost impossible to eradicate (EconomIst, 6 Februar 1993).
This pessimIsm is echoed by Linz, finding little reason to be optimIstic
about the prospects for democratic governments in post-colonial states:
"Consolidated, culturally homogenous, stable democracies are the greatest
guarantee of respect for Human Rights, but only a 1imIted number of states
are like ly to achieve that status" (Linz 1992:221).
However, as theoriesof socio-economIc preconditions do not prove that
democracy cannot be developed in poor countres, the Jact that a specific
kind of political culture is present in democracies does not imply thatths
is a necessar or suffcient condition for democratisation. These are not
"natural laws" valid in all countres at all times. The studies are valuable,
however, in iIumInating difficulties and barers facing Third WorId
countries seeking to develop societies safeguarding democracy and human
rights.
While there are no absolute preconditions for the development of
democratic political systems, it is often maintained that the development
wil have to follow a certin sequence. In Chapter two we referred to
Richard P. Claude's stage model for the historical emergence of rights.
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Explaining under which conditions therights emerged within the Euro-
American cultural area, this model also suggests some general conditions
for development and institutionalisation of rights norms. Claude argues that
a stable, procedurally regulated, legal system must be present if rights are
to be institutionalised, and that civil rights precede the political, social and
economIc rights.
SimIlarly Dahl argues that the attainment of some rights wiI precede
others, or put differently, that some rights wiI hardly surive or exist if
another set of rights is not already present. His hypothesis is that the first
political right most likely wiI be the access to alternative sources of
information. A general freedom of expression wiI develop from here. The
next - and dangerous theshold is the right to political organisation. Only
on this basis, Dahl argues, may the rights to free and fai election be
attained (Dahl 1992).
In this perspective free and fair elections are the culmination of a proeess.
not its beginnng. Indeed, unless and until the other rights and liberties are
firmy protected, free and fair elections canot tae place. Except in
countres aleady close to the tbeshold of democracy. therefore. it is a
mistae to assume that if only the 1eaders of a non-democracy can be
persuaded to hold elections. then full democracy wil follow. (Dahl
1992:248)
The advantage of the early democracies in terms of gradual development
is often emphasised (Lipset 1981:475) The environment within which
democratisation takes place is radically different today. Developing
countres in the post-WorId War Il area have to meet simultaneously the
crises of integration, legitimation, penetration paricipation and distrbution
- demands which are liable to overwhelm the economIc and institutional
capacity of the se states (Huntington, 1968; Binder, 1971; Diamond, 1980).
But again, this does not mean that successful democratization is impossible.
It does, however, imply that it is a serious mIstae to think it wiI be easy
to attn.
Concluding remarks
In ths chapter we have considered the relationship between respect for
human rights on the one hand, and types of regimes on the other. Although
there are flaws in the human rights penormance of democracies, we have
argued that democratic regimes, based on institutions guaranteeing freedom
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of expression, access to information, freedom of organisation and free
competition for leadership, are most Iikely to observe human rights.
Recent developments in international politics, primarly the political
changes in Eastern Europe and large par of the Thd W orId, have
provided democracy with a unique status as a legitimate form of
government. The international community is facing a new and unique
situation. Currently there is no legitimate ideological alternative to
democratic forms of government, and the very politicised - and paralysing
- debate withn the UN system on the relative status of human rights, has
been blunted. This change in ideological-political cIimate has immensely
increased the possibilities for fuering human rights cIaims, in paricular
in the form of calls for multi-par democracy, on the worId scene.
In ths context the requisites for democracy, andobstacles to
democratization are cruciaL. And considerable scholarly energy has been,
and is being, devoted to these questions. The general conclusions seem to
be that democratisation is faciltated by socio-economIc development. The
most important factor in promoting democracy is, however, not economIc
development per se and certly not mere economIc growth. Rather, it is
the social changes improving the physical quality and dignity of people' s
lives, and in parcular reducing the level of absolute poverty. A policy of
giving priority to basic human needs is thus more likely to promote and
sustain democracy (and more humane) than more capital intensive strategies
viewing basic health and literacy needs as consumption that must be
deferred (Diamond, 1992). Development in this sense tends to produce or
faciltate democracy by altering favourably the politicalculture and
promoting anactive civil society.
TheconcIusions in ths chapter influence the trade-off debate presented
in Chapter 3. The cross-national studies of the effects of democracy on
economIc development are not conclusive: still, the evidence is heavily in
favour of the view that political democracy is not incompatible with
development. On the contrar, it seems that political paricipation, liberty ,
accountability and pluralism are conducive to - in some cases even
essential to - development. Several of the studies discussed in this chapter
emphasise that although developing and sustaining democracy is very
diffcult in developing countres, democracy should not be ruled out as
impossible in any countr .Complete institutionalised democracy is less
likely in very poor countres. Stil, even at modest levels of economIc
development countres can achievesignificantly democratic cultures and
reductions in absolute poverty. And if social and political actors, private
and public, focus on these intermediate goals, they stad a good chance of
developing democracy "prematurely" (Diamond 1992). Once having arsen
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for whatever unique historical reason "a political form may persist under
conditions normally adverse to the emergence of that form" (Lipset
1959:28).
In the current politicalsituation the study of the relationships between
human rights, development and political systems are becoming a most
important field of research. As wil be discussed in the following chapter,
concerns for democracy and huma rights observance have gained
increasing promInence in the foreign- and aid policies of Western countres.
Hence, the questions raised in this chapter are urgent: Is it possible for all
states to develop a political culture and institutions that guarantee respect
for human rights? And, how fast and in what way may ths development
progress ?
Comprehensive research is cared out with the objective to identify
preconditions for democracy, and to investigate strctural barers to
development of democratic institutions in Thd WorId countres. The
relationships are becomIng clearer. although several questions are stil
unanswered.
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5. Human rights and foreign policy: Aid
conditionality, election observance and
the role of human rights research
The role of human rights in foreign policy is the concern of the last chapter
of this study. Within ths general focus thee issues are addressed: First and
foremost we look into questions concerning aid conditionality - that is, the
allocation of development aid in response to the regimes' human rights
performance. Secondly, problems related to operationalisation and
assessment of human rights performance are discussed. Finally , we consider
the expanding "industry" of election monitoring.
Throughout, the general concerns underlying the discussions are: what
role should the international community play in advancing human rights
and what should be the role of human rights research in the curent
intemational political situation. Is promotion of human rights a legitimate
con cern of foreign policy? And should aid policies be us ed as means to this
end?
Regimes are increasingly judged and sanctioned according to human
rights criteria. But the expanding use of human rights as a yardstick of
development has been also met wjth criticism. In paricular, objections are
raised against the ways in which development aid is used as a means to
promote respect for human rights.
Conditionality - making the allocation of aid dependent on human rights
practice - is a political decision caring ethical implications. Proponents
of aid conditionality cIaim that ths practice is in accordance with the moral
duty to promote human rights, and a logical consequence of the obligation
of states according to the International Bil of Human Rights. Critics argue
that it is cultual arogance and imperiaIsm, that it implies ilegitimate
interference with the internal affais of other states, and violates the
principle of non-interference in international law. Linking aid transfers and
respect for human rights . also run contrar to the cIaim of third world
countres to more predictable and automatic re source transfers from the
industralised countries.
When disc us sin g these matters the debates reviewed in the previous
chapters are highly relevant: Unless human rights can be justified as
universally valid norms, it cannot be acceptable to make human rights
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respect a condition for development aid. A policy of aid conditionality also
presupposes a certn relationship between human rights, regime types and
economIc development.
In Chapter two we concIuded that even though the status of human rights
as universal norms is disputed, and the accusation of cultual imperialism
cannot be categorically dismIssed, the International Bil of Human Rights
is justified as the object of an overIapping global consensus, and are
Included in international common law. Human rights violations may thus
no longer be considered as the internal affais of a state. Even though the
principle of non-intervention retans validity and guarantees governments
the space to formulate own strategies, the exercise of governental
competence has come under increasing scrutiy. Intervention by the
international community is increasingly becomIng legitimate. Governments
are not only entitled to tae account of human rights violations in their
relations with other states; they have a duty to do so.
We wil argue that while it is defensible to promote human rights
considerations though development aid and foreign policy in general, all
strategies and all human rights stadards are not necessarly legitimate.
Certain requirements must be met as to how this is done, and which human
rights standard forms the basis for such policies.
Aid conditionality
Around the mId-1970s the promotion of respect for human rightsbecame
the offcial aim of American foreign policy. Under President Carer the
American admInistration pursued a human rights policy where foreign aid
was one of several means. The American state deparent began to issue
annual reports on the human rights situation in countres of special interest
to the USA, and aid andloans were witheld from countres that engaged
in gross violations of personal rights to integrty.
In 1975 the Netherlands decided, as first countr in the so called
"LikemInded Group of Donors", 36 to include humanrights criteria in their
foreign aid policies. Norway followed in 1984, Denmark in 1987 and
Canada in 1988.
More countres have followed. During 1990, Germany, Britain and
France all stated intentions of linking aid to the observance of human
36 The Group of Likeminded Countres includes, besides the Netherlands and Norway;
Canada. Denmark. Finland and Sweden. The name refers to their equal stand on issues
of foreign aid. and the fact that these countres are the Western industralised states most
concerned about third world initiatives.
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rights, and promotion of good government, and at the Houston Summt in
July 1990 the Group of Seven37 declared a determnation to assist peoples
in achieving and sustaining economIc prosperity and political freedom~ The
following year the Council of Ministers of the European Community (EC)
adopted a declaration on "Human Rights, Democracy and Development
Cooperation Policy". Development and consolidation of democracy, the rule
of law and respect for human rights, are identified as major concerns for
EC development cooperation, and it is explicitly stated that adverse
reactions should be used to respond to gross and systematic violations of
human rights. Only general statements are made, however, about the links
between democracy, development and human rights. While allegiance is
pledged towards the UN human rights stadards, explicit criteria are largely
absent (Biering 1992:52).
Ths is a common phenomenon. Human rights concerns, linked to "the
promotion of good government", is at curent a stated aim of the aid
policies of a number of countres as well as of international development
and lending institutions such as the UNP and the World Bank. Criteria
are, however, generally vague. And when they are made more explicit they
tend to be rather controversial (cf. Barh 1993).
Jf human rights considerations are to be promoted though foreign aid
policies, one of the problems that need to be sol ved is to come up with a
valid standard of human rights. We wiI return to this question below.
Equally important, however, are questions concerning which strategies and
means should be applied.
The sanctioning method, characterising the US foreign policy since the
mid-1970s, is by Katana Tomasevski described as a remote-control
development (Tomasevski 1989:53). Foreign aid, used in this way, becomes
a reward for human rights observance and if withheld, functions as
punishmentfor human rights violations. The resulting unpredictability and
lack of continuity detractsfrom the effciency of the aid. Human rights
objectives narowly defined may thus block what is the primar goal of
foreign aid: to contrbute to better conditions for deprived and under-
privileged groups. At the same time human rights area crucial aspect of
this goal. Can foreign aid policies be efficient means in the promotion of
human rights objectives, and at the same time avoid conflcts with other
development goals?
The Dutch Foreign Minister, Jan Pronk, has argued that human rights are
best promoted though foreign aid policies str ving for structural changes.
37 The Group ofSeven is a forum of the seven leading industral countries, i.e. the USA,
Japan. Canada, Britain, Germany, Franee and Italy.
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Aid policies may be par of a general. political commtment to more just
social strctures, improving fundamentaly the conditions of poor peoples
as well as for the deprived withn each countr. More directly, aid may be
directed at the victims of rights violations and thus initiate processes
contrbuting to freedom and right to codetennnation for the poor (Pronk
1977:36).
This view enjoys widespread scholarly support.38 It is maitained that
to use foreign aid policy as a stimulating factor is more effcient and more
in line with human rights objectives than a sanctioning policy. Aid should
be used as a means to accommodate increased respect for human rights in
recipient countres, and not as rewards for good performance. However, to
stimulate increased realisation of human rights implies greater costs for the
donor countres.
Jf foreign aid is to cater to human rights concems, narowly defined, as
well as more general developmental goals, it must be granted on the basis
of popular need, and not on the basis of governmental policies. This
requires a bottom-up approach where projects are designed in cooperation
with the local population in the areas in question, perhaps by a channeIlng
of resources to locally based volunta organsations (Andreassen 1991). In
many cases local non-governmenta organisations (NGOs) know which
needs that most urgently need to be attended to, and their knowledge of the
local community may secure that the aid is distrbuted in comp1iance with
its purose. It is not altogether unproblematic to depend on volunta
organisations, however. Local, as well as international NGOs var in
quality, and they should be thoroughly evaluated. In many African
countres, there are hardly any local organisations, and those who do exist
are of ten very weak. This strategy is thus both limIted and complex.
Advocates of NGO strategi es argue that channellng foreign aid directly
to local volunta organisations is a way to strengthen . the development of
a public awareness of human rights, which in tu could influence
. governmental policies (Andreassen 1991). This sword cuts both ways,
however. Extemal strengthening of NGO sectors when the state is weak,
may also prevent a national consensus on basic rules from emerging (Cf.
Tvedt 1990).
There is reason to believe that NGO strategies could function
satisfactorily in regions where the human rights situation is considered to
be good, and where there are few conflicts. Jf used in more repressive
societies, such strategies must be introduced with great care. In such
38 Cf. Yearook on Human Rights 1986, 1987-88; Donnelly & Howard 1988. and
Tomasevski 1989.
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countries, a strategy channellng considerable economIc resources to local
human rights organisations mIght well ruin the organisations in question,
as well as precIude any offcial contact between donor and receiving
countres. Hence, NGO strategies require careful analyses of the actual
situation; how thevolunta organisations and the rest of civil society
function, both internally and towards the government. In countres with a
high level of conflct and gross human rights violations, such strategies
imply great risks and the utmost care must be taken.
A common standard of human rights
Donor countres do not agree on which categories of human rights are the
more importt in relation to development aid. Under Carer, the USA
stressed promotion of the personal right to integrty, while under Reagan
the focus was on the political right to parcipation. Social and economIc
rights have largely been neglected in American human rights policies. Other
countres, such as the Netherlands and Norway, have in principle incIuded
social and economIc rights on a more equal basis. A white paper from the
Norwegian Parliament states that Norwegian foreign aid is to be poverty
oriented, beneficiar oriented, presented as gift, untied, 50 per cent
bilaterally distrbuted among main cooperation countres, and that "priority
is to be given to poor countres stressing the development of social justice
and observance of the UN' s political, civii, economIcal and social human
rights" (Stortingsmelding nr. 36, 1984-85).
Since the late 1980s, there has been a tendency to equate concerns for
human rights with support for democratisation or "promotion of good
government". "Good government" comprises sound economIc and social
policies; offcials and institutionsable to design and implement right
policies; and the respect for human rights and rule of law (Biering
1992:50). This form of conditionaIity, as is found e.g. in current EC foreign
aid policies, extends to accountability, openness, transparency in decision-
makng, and in many cases also to the rules goveming political competition
and representation.
The difference between human rights stadards is an importnt reason
why makng human rights respect a term for foreign aid is controversial
(Tomasevski 1989:64). Adding to this is the fact that the practice of
important nations is not very consistent, even on the basis of their own
standards. Sanctions tend to be issued in response to human rights
violations only where the interest of the donor countr isnot at risk. The
transgressions of more promInent states tend to be overlooked: For instance,
the unwillngness of major donors, such as the EC, Japan, the World Bank
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and the Asian Development Bank, to condemn human rights violations in
East Timor, has been ascribed to the rapidly growing economy of
Indonesia; toa many companes are probably looking for business in the
region... (Cf. Bierig 1992). Aid conditionality under these circumstaces,
rather than working to advance universal norms, amount to a promotion of
the self-interest of donor countres - or may at least appear so for those
bein g sanctioned.
Concrete criteria based on uniform and ideologically neutral human rights
standards, is necessar if the se problems are to be overcome. Merely an
agreement among the great powers wil not do. Therefore, although liberal
democracy at the moment may be a largely uncontested political.ideal, this
should not be equated with respect for human rights. A legitimate human
rights stadard must be based on the entie International Bil of Human
Rights.
Althoughthe International Bil of Human Rights represents a form of
global consensus on an abstract level, the formulations are often vague.
There is considerably less consensus on the actual implementation. Simply
referrng to international human rights stadards does not solve any
problems. Conflcting views on which duties human rights places on states
and other agents on the international arena, constitute a real problem,
especially when social and economic rights are concerned.
A common stadard of human rights must meet the following
requirements: There must be an ideologically balanced selection of rights
based on an international consensus. Moreover, these rights must be agreed
upon on a concrete leve l, concerning e.g. the degree and scope of
governmental commtment. In addition, human rights violations in general
should be consideredmost grave when they are systematic, extensive,
and/or are commtted with active parcipation or passive acknowledgement
by the authorities.
Some scholars argue that there is a core of rights, on which there is
'general consensus, also on a concrete leveI. David W. Gilies discerns a
core of five rights, and cIaims that the significance of these rights is
generally recognised (Gilles 1990). These are: 1) the freedom from extra-
judicial killng, 2) freedom from tortre, 3) freedom from arbitrar arest
and imprisonment, 4) freedom from hunger and 5) freedom from
discrimInation. The former thee are rights that have been granted an
absolute legal status in international Conventions, and violations of these
rìghts cannot be accepted. The rights are now included in international law,
and are thus binding to all states, not only to those that have ratified the
conventions. The two last rights are also basic.international norms caring
normative force.
65
The core rights should be given first priority both in the monitoring of
the rights situation in developing countres and as human rights objectives
for foreign aid policies. Second priority should be given to legal protecuon,
while central civil and political rights are given third place. Civil and
political rights are stressed primarlyon the basis of their position in the
donor countres. These democrauc rights, according to Gilies, have a
weaker normative basis and should thus be given less attention.
The above suggested ranng of especially importt human rights is
interesting as it identifies a set of core rights cIaimed to enjoy international
support. Freedom from hunger, a central socio-economIc right, is included
in the core rights, thus providing them with a certn ideological balance.
Social, economIc and cultural rights are, beyond what is implied by the
rights to non-discrimInation, given Iittle attention, although they are meant
to be universally guaranteed rights.
Such hierarchies of rights are, however, controversial. It is at varance
with offcial UN policy, holding that different categories of rights are
incomparable, and that the rights are interdependent. ProcIamations of
indivisible and interdependent human rights are, in turn, criticised for
covering up the actual contradictory natue of human rights considerations,
and for violating the basic intuition that certn rights (e.g. the right to
food) are more fundamental than others (e.g. the right to vacation with
salar) (GiIies 1990).
Measuring, monitoring and reporting human rights in
developing countries
Pioneering work regarding the measuring and reportng of human rights
conditions, is done in relation to The Yearbook of Human Rights in
Developing Countres (hereafter the Yearbook). The project was initiated
in 1985 to investigate the human rights situauon of Norway's main
cooperation countres. Although American and Dutch Foreign Affairs
Admnistrations had earlier issued annual report on the human rights
situations in their respective cooperation countres, the Norwegian project
was stil pioneering as it was cared out by independent scholars.39 What
stared as an initiative by the Programme for Human Rights Studies at the
39 The work was funded by the Minisuy of Development Cooperation, but the Norwegian
authorities are not responsible for, nor do they influence. the contents of the report. The
term "Yearbook" is somewhat misleading, as the reports for financial reasons have not
been issued every year.
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Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Bergen, in cooperation with the
Norwegian Human Rights Project in Oslo (presently Institute for Human
Rights) have since been joined by human rights institutes in a number of
countres - Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, Canada and Sweden.
There are importnt differences between the Yearook and the annual
report from the US State Deparent. Wh1e the US Countr Report
comprise report on the human rights situation of practically all countres
except the USA itself, the Yearbook concentrates on a limted number of
countres. The basis of the assessments also differs. The US Countr
Reports assess the human rights situation in the worId according to the
following list of rights (1988):
1) Respect for personal integrity, Le. freedom from political
assassinations, disappearances, torte and other crel, inhuman or
humIliating treatment or punishment, arbitrar arest, imprisonment
orexile, denial of a public tral and aritrar interference in the
citizen's private life, famly, home or correspondence;
2) Respect for civil rights, Le. right to free speech, free press, assembly
and organisation, to free exercise of religion and travel within the
countr, and the rights to freely leave the countr;
3) respect for political rights, i.e. the right of citizens to change their
government;
4) the authorities' attitude to investigations of alleged human rights
violations;
5) discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, language, social
status, and
6) collective negotiations, laws against forced labour, mInimum age for
child labour and acceptable workingconditions.
The report are considered comprehensive and thorough, but are flawed by
the fact that, due to the way they are collected, political considerations
sometimes influence the reporting.40 Another important objection is the
fact that social and economIc rights are not included.
The Yearbook, whose geographical scope is modest.compared to the US
Countr Report, is more ambitious in its contents.41 The reports contan
40 US arbassadors in the respective countres have been responsib1e for the reporting.
41 The 1989-issue of the Yearook reported on the human rights situauon of thirteen
countres, in the 1991 issue the number was 10. The countres reported on differ from
year to year. rotaung arong the developing countres of parcular interest to the
countres where the varous panicipaung institutes are located.
67
information on 1) the governmental attitude to human rights, 2) system of
government and parcipation rights, 3) civil libertes, 4) socio-economIc
rights and 5) equality, the right not to be discrimiated against, and the
rights of populations and mInorities.
Social, economIc and cultual rights are given as much attention as the
civil and political rights. By focusing on social and economIc rights it
iIumInates an areaoftn ignored in human rights reporting, and
circumvents to a certn extent the accusations of ethno-centrism of ten
directed at such report. The problem of determning to what extent the
authorities are responsible for human rights violations have also been dealt
with in a better way in the Yearbook than in most other report - although
the authorities' abilty to prevent rights violations may be overestimated,
human rights violations by ared opposition groups are reported and
exhaustive analyses of the socio-political and economIc conditions are
caried out (Gilies 1990). Critics have pointed out that the social and
economIc rights chosen as basis for the report are relatively vaguely
defined, and that it is disputable what these rights imply when it comes to
satisfaction of individual needs and state responsibilty (Gilies 1990:20).
This criticism is only parly valid, as a great effort is placed on
operationalisation and designing of mInimum stadards for central, although
vaguely defined social and economIc rights. However, there stil is a need
for methods that may present a more dear and precise picture of the actual
human rights situations, and of the development trends in varous countres.
It has also been objected that even if the number of countres is relatively
limIted, it is impossible to deaI properly with the historical, economIc,
social and political context of 13 countres within the framework set for the
Yearbook (Tvedt 1990: 106- 107). In order to avoid becomIng situation
reports rather than analyses of developmenttrends, a substatial par of the
Yearbook is now devoted to more general analyses, and the number of
countres furter limIted. The Yearbook attempts to present a nuanced and
at the same time dear picture though an assessment on a broad basis. Jf
reports on human rights situations in developing countres are to provide a
basis for political action, they must include as many aspects as possible of
the countres in question.
An alternative framework for reportng and evaluating human rights is
presented by Rhoda E. Howard and Jack Donnelly (1988). They propose
a short-list of carefully selected rights as the appropriate strategy.
A list of 10 rights, divided into four categories, is suggested: The first is
survival rights, I.e. the rights to life, food and health care. The second is
participation rights, guaranteeing the individual its equal position in
society. This category is represented by famly rights and laws against
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discrimInation. The third category is protection rights, protecting the
individual against state violations; the rights to habeas corpus42 and an
independent judicial system. The fourt and last category is the
authorisation rights,granting the individual control of his own Iife,
especially in relation to the state. Ths category is represented by the right
to education, free press and organisation.
Ths selection is justified as contaning estimates for almost all other
rights. The list - unlike GiIIes' core rights - does not imply a rights
hierarchy, but taes as its premIse the interdependency of the human rights.
The above rights have been chosen, not because they are more important
than other rights in a moral sense, but due to their methodological
signifcance. Because of the logical, political and moral interconnection
between the human rights. norm, a state that observes the se ten rights wil
most likely observe the other rights as well (Donnelly and Howard 1988).
And a welI-functioning short-list simplifies research on human rights as
well as reportng.
Social and economIc rights do not receive much attention in this short-
list, and in ths sen se it reflects a traditional Western liberal conception of
human rights. In order to avoid charges of ideological lopsidedness - and
to function according to its general intentions - the strategy relies
precariously on the validity of the underlying assumption that human rights
are in fact interdependent. Although ths reflects the politically correct view
of the UN, a UN decision, as previously noted, results from compromIse
and political strggle, and does not in and by itself provide any guarantee
of the empirical relationship between the different rights.
A common standard of human rights providing an uncontested basis for
reports on the human rights situation in developing countres, and guiding
the foreign policies of donor countres, appears to be a dis tant goal.
However, it seems dear that the challenge is thee-fold: We must a) find
methods of reportng that present a comprehensive picture of the total
. human rights situation in the relevant countres, and b) analyse development
trends on the basis of socio-political and economIc varab1es, and c) reach
an ideologically balanced concentration on certain basic rights.
42 Habeas corpus is original ly the title of a British law from 1679. and states the right not
to be imprisoned or kept in prison without a tral and conviction.
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Ethical aspects of human rights reporting and assessment
Three requirements may be posed to Western democracies monitoring the
human rights situation of other countres (Howard 1990): Firstly, the human
rights definitions functioning as basis for the report must comply with
international stadards, and cover the entire range of rights included in the
International Bil of Human Rights.
Secondly, regimes reportng and assessing human rights situations in
other countres must be sensitive to the views of their own population -
abstract criteria that do not reflect the opinion in the electorate, mIght
possibly pre vent human rights from becomIng important considerations in
the foreign policy of Western democracies.
Thrdly, countres that evaluate other countres should also exercise some
self-assessment and submIt itself to scrutiny of its own human rights record.
A problem with international human rights monitoring is that the countres
responsible for reporting do not report on their own human rights situation.
Donors should measure up to the stadards that they use on recipient
countres - and historical and existing socio-economIc differences between
countres should be duly considered. There is a cIose empircal relationship
between respect for human rights and leveI of economIc development, and
wealthy donor countres should be judged more harshly than poor countres
- which even with the best of intentions have no way of feeding its
population.
Focus should also be placed on those human rights violations one' s own
countr directly or indirectly may have contrbuted to. Obvious examples
are the US policies in Latin America, and the Soviet support for Mengistus'
regime in Ethiopia. In this connection it is interesting to note that the
weighty security interest of great powers, and the economIc interest
promoted by strong internal pressure groups, may conflct with a
dependable and effcient human rights policy. Human rights considerations
are prone to be. overrn by, or used as front for, other foreign policy
Interests.The varing abilty of small and large countres tocar out
effcient human rights policies is discussed by Jan Egeland, in his book
Impotent Superpower, Potent Small-state (1988). His the sis is that small
countries have a comparative advantage in ths area.
Self-assessment, cared out in an ideologically balanced way, may
reduce the self-complacent attitude so often found in Western countries that
evaluate and report on the (lack of) human rights respect of other countres.
In Norway' s case, issues such as the rights of the SamI population, the
legal protection of custody prisoners and psychiatrc patients, the rights of
the old, children and the disabled, and on the treatment of immgrants and
asylum-seekers should be given parcular attention. Without such self-
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assessment, human rights report may be conceived as, and wil actually be,
a kind of ideological manipulation by Western democracies str 
ving to
pro mote their own political and economIc system.
Ths is parcularly important at a time where the political and economIc
system of the West - liberal multi-par democracy - is mostvigorously
exported. Before drawing this study to a cIose, it is necessar to make some
comments regarding the boost in "electoral assistace" and international
election observance.
Pollwatching and human rights.
Over the last few years, with the transitions from authoritaan rule in a
number of developing countres, international election observers and experts
offering technical electoral assistace has become a central and visible
element in world politics. What are we to conclude after a few year with
boosting poIlwatching-activity - or political toursm as the most critical
voices choose to call it.
The proponents of international electoral observation argue that ths
activity is crucial where elections are controversiaI. (Cf. McCoy et. al.
1991) An external neutral par is required in order to assess the fairness
of the electoral process. And observers have an effect in preventing the
rigging of elections. They may also function as mediators in conflctual
situations.
It is becomIng increasingly cIear, however, that poIlwatching in its
present form have serious shortcomIngs: The time perspective is usually
very short '- focus is almost solelyon the activities ofelection day. The
important preparatory activities - registration of votersand candidates,
electoral campaigns etc., where the more important strctural rigging may .
take place - are largely overlooked. And even the counting of votes is
largely ignored by international election observers (Cf. Andreassen 1993).
Jf the current practice of poIlwatching in the sense of "sitting in on election
day" is continued, the international community may risk that they decIare
"free and fai elections" - and thus provide regimes with legitimacy on
rather shaky grounds. This is, in the long term, prone to delegitimIse the
activity itself.
Electoral observance, if conducted in a less haphazard manner, may
however contrbute to stabilty at crucial stages of democratisation. This
requires involvement over a longer period of time, oftencoupled with
technical electoral assistance, and it requires observers who are well
prepared and who have a cIear conception of their ownrole-lately there
have been several instaces (e.g. in relation to the Kenyan 1992-elections)
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where observer teams seemed to conceive of themselves as "agents on the
side of democracy" rather than imparal observers.
Election observance and electoral assistace is currently the "growth-
industry" of the UN. Joined by observers and technical experts from a host
of non-governmental organisations and semI-govemmenta institutions, the
representatives of the UN have been present at a substantial number of
elections over the past few year; in Nicaragua, Angola, Zambia, Ethiopia,
Kenya and Eritrea, just to mention a few. And the demand seems to be
ever-increasing. The UN established its electoral assistance unit in October
1992, and at the time of writing (May 1993) 34 requests regarding technical
electoral assistance and poIlwatching are waiting to be handled.
Substatial economIc resources are required if these tasks are to be
attended to - and even if the money for sending hundreds and thousands
of internationalobservers can be obtaed, there is the question of whether
this is the best way to spend resources in developing countres.
Critics have argued that placing such great attention on elections rather
than other aspects of development and democratisation is to take the easy
way out. Even when properly conducted, pollwatching may be said to cater
more adequately for the needs of the UN and major donor countres- to
accomplish visible results - than to the needs of developing countres in
processes of democratization.
Jf the se effort are at all to be legitimate, it is crucial that elections are
not seen as the culmInation of democracy - at best they are a first step
towards building it. There is still a lot to be established about the
preconditions for the establishment of democracy in developing countries,
but, on the basis of the research reviewed in the previous chapter, we know
enough to issue a prelimInar note of waring: while free and fair elections
are vital to democracy, it should be viewedas a final step, not as the
driving force of the democratisation process.
Concluding remarks - the role of human rights research '
What should be the role of human rights research in the present situation
where human rights concerns figure promInently. in foreign policy - as
reflected in the widespread practices of aid conditionality and election
observance?
Human rights research has often, and not unjustly so,been regarded as
a form of activism. Generally , researchers in this field have be en openly
and strongly commtted to the ideal of human rights, considering their work
as a way to promote understading of and respect for human rights. And
human rights research has generally been cared out "in opposition".
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Research has been an importt par of the strggle for placing human
rights issues on the political agendas, and for gettg power behind human
rights concems. The link between research and activism is under such
circumstaces understadable, probably unavoidable and maybe even
desirable.
When human rights - and currently in parcular those associated with
democracy and good government - are embraced by the establishment and
function as base for political decision makng, it is, however, extremely
important that human rights researchers safeguard their scholarly integrty.
Not that "democracy" and "good government" are not ideals worty of
pursuing; they are indeed, and they are cIosely linked to human rights. But
they are not synonymous with the International Bil of Rights - in the
sense of a set of norm which, seen as a whole, balances different
ideological and political concerns in such a manner that it may be said to
represent a global consensus.
In a situation where the Western liberal tradition (the tradition most
heavily influencing human rights research) have such a tremendous backing
in terms of political power, so as to more or less appease opposing strands
of thinkng on human rights, it is crucial - for the long term legitimacy
of human rights thoughout the worId - that human rights researchers are
not seen as merelyerrand boys for the West. They must remain in
opposition.
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